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I. INTRODUCTION 
In the early days after the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) rise to power over 
mainland China in 1949, the United States implemented policies rejecting the new 
government outright, restraining its ability to engage in diplomacy, and controlling its 
access to resources for economic development. This Cold War mentality and the 
accompanying dual xenophobia in some segments of these dichotomous cultures and 
opposing ideologies were briefly set aside during the early 1970s and 1980s in order to 
serve pragmatic concerns of balancing against the threat posed by the Soviet Union.1 
While this period of limited American engagement with the People’s Republic of China 
(PRC) served the strategic goals of drawing the CCP toward U.S. political interests and 
dividing Communist bloc efforts to struggle against Western capitalism, foundations for 
future cooperation between the U.S. and Chinese sides were not sufficiently developed to 
ensure peaceful co-existence for the long term. Diplomatic deliberations throughout the 
early 1970s made significant progress toward establishing the PRC as a government more 
broadly recognized by the Western world.2 Avenues for political discourse and 
cooperation between the United States and PRC were cultivated through the exchange of 
ambassadors, various high-level summits and the installation of PRC representatives into 
the United Nations. Economic relationships have flourished in the past two decades as the 
PRC economy has reformed to allow market forces to influence commercial activity and 
trade controls have loosened to permit an open exchange of goods and services.3 These 
channels for cooperation and peaceful resolution of differences have yielded great returns 
in recent years and should be continued and expanded at each opportunity. 
However, throughout this period of remarkable economic reform within the PRC 
and political engagement between the CCP and the U.S. government, a third pillar of 
 
1 Roderick Macfarquhar, The Politics of China: The Eras of Mao and Deng (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1997), 264. 
2 While some major western powers, such as the United Kingdom, established diplomatic relations 
with the PRC soon after its formation, formal recognition of the PRC by numerous nations aligned with 
American foreign policy objectives began in earnest during the early 1970s with the removal of U.S. 
objections and political pressure. 
3 An example of PRC economic reform can be seen in efforts to transition the bulk of the nation’s 
productive capacity to the private sector from inefficient State Owned Enterprises. Seth Faison, “In Major 
Shift, China Will Sell State Industries.” The New York Times, 12 September 1997. 
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positive official relations has not been pursued consistently. Opportunities to build 
rapport between both countries’ national leadership and government institutions have 
been sometimes sacrificed in the interest of rewarding or punishing China for its 
cooperation, or lack thereof, on issues. Specifically, the lack of positive, systemic, long-
term military-to-military relations between the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) and 
the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has perpetuated a sense of estrangement 
between the two governments and their attendant military leaders. Since the early days of 
post-Mao cooperation between the PRC and United States, military collaboration has 
been in a constant state of flux due to the inability of each government to look beyond 
short-term political disagreements to the broader goal of pan-Pacific security cooperation.  
Over the course of the past quarter century, this pattern of episodic vacillation has 
limited both nations’ abilities to clearly understand each other’s strategic intentions, 
doctrinal influences or decision-making processes. By understanding the historical, 
cultural and contemporary foundations for various conflicts of interest between the 
United States and China, policy-makers and military leaders on both sides of the Pacific 
can more adroitly negotiate, effectively collaborate and avoid antagonizing each other 
over issues of short-term concern. The practice of halting security cooperation as a sign 
of protest against perceived injustice has an immeasurable impact on each nation’s long-
term strategic interests in exchange for achieving limited foreign policy objectives or 
satisfying a finite domestic political agenda item. In addition to reducing military 
exchanges in response to general disagreement over many of each others’ strategic goals 
and methods, there have been several specific crises over the past fifteen years that 
epitomize these ad hoc stop-and-start engagement practices. Included among these 
incidents are the U.S. response to CCP actions against pro-democracy protests in 
Tiananmen Square in 1989 and the PRC reaction to U.S. forces inadvertently bombing 
the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade, Yugoslavia in 1999.4  
By avoiding short-term thinking in mutual engagement efforts that benefit each 
nation’s long-term strategic interests, the United States and the People’s Republic of 
 
4 Bonnie S. Glaser “Beginning to Thaw,” Center for Strategic and International Studies Pacific Forum 
- Comparative Connections (3rd Quarter 1999). [e-journal] available from: 
http://www.csis.org/pacfor/cc/993Qus_china.html; Internet; accessed 28 Jan 2005. 
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China can both achieve higher states of security, stability and prosperity for their 
respective citizenry. As the United States military develops stable, systemic relations 
with the PLA, tensions between the military leadership of both sides will begin to 
moderate.5 A new crop of general officers will come to power in each nation’s military 
with a more complete understanding of how their mutual interests can best be served 
through cooperation, not antagonism. Furthermore, as each side deepens its cooperative 
exchanges to include lower ranking officers, their respective governments lay a solid 
foundation for mutual security and regional stability that will perpetuate itself for 
generations to come. 
This thesis will develop recommendations for improving U.S.-PRC military-to-
military relations by assessing the nature and importance of American interests in East 
Asia, discussing several of the most salient trends in the region’s security environment 
and formulating its basic argument within the framework of the bipolar debate that 
persists in today’s policymaking circles. This debate over whether American foreign 
policy should seek to ‘contain’ China’s rise in economic, political and military power or 
‘engage’ the PRC as an important and viable partner is discussed at length in order to 
establish a historical foundation for contemporary policy prescriptions. In order to build a 
solid program of American military engagement with the PLA for the future, this thesis 
draws on case studies of positive, long-term, cooperative security relationships with two 
key Asian partners. A thorough review of U.S. military relations with the Republic of 
China on Taiwan and the Kingdom of Thailand over the past sixty years reveals the high-
level benefits of extensive contact between the armed forces of both polities, as well as 
specific engagement programs that warrant emulation in the context of U.S.-PRC 
relations.  
A. U.S. NATIONAL INTERESTS IN EAST ASIA 
1. Regional Stability 
A basic premise of contemporary U.S. foreign policy is that encouraging 
governments to transition from autocracy to free and democratic societies breeds 
 
5 Ronald Montaperto, “Engaging China’s Military: Blueprint for a New Military Relationship with 
China,” Rough Waters: Navigating the US-China Security Agenda (June 1998) [On-line]; available from 
http://www.nyu.edu/globalbeat/asia/china/06221998montaperto.html; Internet; accessed 17 Jan 2005.  
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prosperity and peaceful coexistence between nations.6 Over the course of the past three 
decades, cultural and informational exchanges, as well as commercial trade between U.S. 
and PRC markets, have supported this fundamental goal and improved state-to-state 
relations between their two governments. As the PRC continues its economic reform 
process toward greater transparency and reduced emphasis on central planning, Chinese 
citizens are experiencing increases in their standard of living and have higher 
expectations for equitable treatment from their government.7 This phenomenon will 
continue as a ‘virtuous cycle” of increases in productivity, savings, investment, fiscal 
solvency and quality of life for the foreseeable future as long as the rule of law is 
maintained and the petitions of citizens are earnestly reviewed and fulfilled.8 Present 
trends indicate that this process of economic growth will continue to encourage China’s 
political liberalization process,9 albeit at an extremely slow pace when measured against 
U.S. expectations, thereby evolving into a system closely approximating Western values 
of freedom, democracy and justice within the PRC polity. As this internal stability 
generates greater political participation by rank-and-file citizens, inherent checks and 
balances of a Western-style democratic system will moderate central government foreign 
policies, reduce antagonistic rhetoric and discourage employment of military force to 
achieve national objectives. On-going efforts to increase political participation through 
village-level democratic election reforms, central party campaigns against political 
 
6 U.S. President. State of the Union Address. 1994. Clinton Presidential Center. 25 January 1994. [On-
line]; available from http://www.clintonpresidentialcenter.org/legacy/012594-speech-by-president-sotu-
address.htm; Internet; accessed 18 Jan 2005 and U.S. President. Inaugural Address. 2005. Office of the 
Press Secretary. 20 January 2005. [On-line]; available from 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/01/20050120-1.html; Internet; accessed 8 Mar 2005.  
7 Bruce J. Dickson “Democratic Development in Taiwan: A Model for the PRC?,” Center for Strategic 
and International Studies Pacific Forum - PacNet Newsletter (27 October 2000). [e-journal] available 
from: http://www.csis.org/pacfor/pac0043.html; Internet; accessed 28 Jan 2005. 
8 “Economist Calls for Lifting Rein on Non-State Sectors and Tapping Rural Market.” People’s Daily 
(Beijing), 22 July 2002; [On-line] available from: 
http://english.people.com.cn/200207/19/eng20020719_99990.shtml; Internet; accessed 28 Jan 2005. 
9 H. Lyman Miller, “The Hu-Wen Leadership at Six Months,” China Leadership Monitor (Fall 2003), 
1. [e-journal] available from: http://www.chinaleadershipmonitor.org/20034/lm.pdf; Internet; accessed 28 
Jan 2005. 
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corruption and greater transparency in government affairs all point to a strengthening of 
civic awareness among the general populace of the PRC.10  
Thus, by engaging the common citizen in the fundamental political processes of 
the PRC, one of the most pressing sources of interregional tension between the United 
States and China can be eliminated. Evidence of greater civil participation in government, 
transparency in CCP decision-making processes and responsible behavior in regional 
political-military affairs undermines many of the U.S. domestic arguments for 
confrontation with China. Furthermore, trans-Pacific commercial interdependence not 
only creates a situation wherein both states may influence each other’s decision making 
processes, but also constitutes a vested interest in their former adversary’s economic 
well-being in order to ensure their own continued prosperity. This phenomenon will also 
reduce intra-regional tensions as the varied interests of East Asia’s politically diverse 
nations become linked to one another through commerce and a common understanding 
that collective well-being enhances the stability, status and prestige of the individual 
states. Foremost among the beneficiaries of this East Asian regional interdependence 
policy are the PRC and the government of the Republic of China on Taiwan.11
2. Reduction of Cross-Strait Tensions 
While the provocative conduct of the government of North Korea with regard to 
its alleged nuclear weapons capability holds significant potential to destabilize East 
Asia,12 the greater threat by far to continued peace in the region is the onset of military 
hostilities between Taiwan and mainland China. Due to the long history of cooperation 
between the Republic of China and the United States, any conflict between the PLA and 
Taiwan military will most certainly involve a U.S. response to either maintain the status 
quo or repel an invasion. A clash between China and the United States would seriously 
affect the global economy through a disruption of Pacific trade, a shift of priorities from 
 
10 Gunter Schubert, “Stability Through More Participation? - Local Direct Elections and Their Impact 
On Communist Rule In Present-Day China,” ASIEN (July 2002), 49. [On-line] available from: 
http://www.asienkunde.de/articles/schubert84.pdf; Internet; accessed 28 Jan 2005. 
11 Scott L. Kastner, “Ambiguity, Economic Interdependence, and the U.S. Strategic Dilemma in the 
Taiwan Strait,” Unpublished Paper (2004), 20. [On-line] available from: 
http://www.bsos.umd.edu/gvpt/kastner/Kastnerambiguity.pdf; Internet; accessed 28 Jan 2005. 
12 Lee Soo-hyuck, “Measures and Prospects on the Resolution of the DPRK Nuclear Issue,” Third 
International Institute for Strategic Studies Shangri-la Dialogue, Singapore, 4-6 June 2004. [On-line] 
available from: http://www.iiss.org/showdocument.php?docID=382; Internet; accessed 8 Mar 2005. 
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commercial to military production and a rapid increase in global oil prices. Additionally, 
an escalation of this notional conflict to include PLA attacks on U.S. installations 
throughout the western Pacific could embroil Japan13 and South Korea into the struggle 
and even result in an exchange of nuclear weapons. The present U.S. policy of “strategic 
ambiguity,” neither confirming, nor denying, our intention to defend Taiwan against an 
assault by the mainland, limits both sides’ predisposition to decide the issue of the island 
polity’s political status unilaterally. However, the growing cultural, informational and, 
especially, commercial exchanges regularly occurring between Taiwan and the mainland 
hold even greater promise for continued peace in the region than the threat of U.S. 
military intervention. 
While the threat of active intervention by the United States to physically defend 
the Republic of China (ROC) from military attack has long held the conflict between 
Taiwan and the PRC in abeyance, this confrontational posture has not succeeded in 
fostering positive relations between the two polities. Past U.S. efforts increasing ROC 
capabilities to defend itself through arms sales and White House statements of 
unambiguous support for that island’s right to political self-determination have generated 
significant angst and ire among the leadership of the CCP. From the PRC perspective of 
the Taiwan question being an internal issue, the tiresome U.S. policy of meddling in 
Chinese domestic affairs continues to require a significantly hard-line stance to defend its 
national sovereignty and domestic socio-political stability. Prudent reaction to a ROC 
military build-up requires a concurrent increase in PLA capabilities across the Taiwan 
Strait in the form of the relatively inexpensive and reasonably effective surface-to-surface 
missile force deployed throughout mainland China’s southern coastal provinces. 
Conversely, ceaseless efforts on the part of state-sponsored, non-governmental 
organizations promoting cross-strait tourism, correspondence, direct shipping and 
commercial airline flights continue to make progress in developing grassroots linkages 
and interdependent economies. Billions of dollars of direct investment and an even 
greater value of goods and services traverse the Taiwan Strait each year. Just as strong 
business interests within the PRC have encouraged greater political liberalization (as 
 
13 Kosuke Takahashi, “China ‘Threat’ Strengthens US-Japan Military Ties.” Asia Times, 13 January 
2005; [On-line] available from: http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Japan/GA13Dh01.html; Internet; accessed 8 
Mar 2005. 
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evident in recent constitutional amendments ensuring private property rights14), the 
strong relationships developed during the course of business transactions between PRC 
and ROC entrepreneurs, financiers and consumers will encourage a peaceful conclusion 
of the reunification question. 
Further reduction of the hard-line position of PLA leadership with regard to 
Taiwan reunification, increased professionalization reforms within the PLA personnel 
system, and a continuation of policies designed to reduce PLA involvement in politics 
will all encourage a peaceful resolution to cross-Strait tensions. Efforts to liberalize PLA 
civil-military relations and reduce its influence outside of the realm of national defense 
will likely achieve positive results similar to those programs undertaken by various East 
and Southeast Asian nation-states over the past decade. Democratizing reforms, bolstered 
by increased civilian control over national military forces and divestiture of non-defense 
functions from the armed forces, have made significant progress toward social stability, 
economic prosperity and regional solidarity throughout Asia. A critical tool in promoting 
these trends is extensive military-to-military exchanges between U.S. DoD personnel and 
service members of the PLA. By promoting current efforts to professionalize and 
depoliticize the officer corps of the Chinese military, the U.S. government can help 
reduce the likelihood of the armed forces of both nations being drawn into combat 
operations against one another and promote the peaceful resolution of the Taiwan Strait 
crisis. 
3. Maintenance of U.S. Regional Influence 
The rise of China’s economic influence throughout East Asia has been paralleled 
by an increased ability to project its political influence into parts of the region that have 
heretofore been predominantly under the sway of U.S. interests. Various indicators of this 
loss of influence have come to light in recent years, demonstrating the PRC’s rise in 
political, economic, and military power with respect to its neighbors and regional trading 
partners. As China surpassed the United States in total trade volume with the Republic of 
 
14 “2004 White Paper: American Business in China-Property Rights,” American Chamber of 
Commerce-PRC, 2004; [On-line] available from http://www.amcham-
china.org.cn/publications/white/2004/en-23.htm; Internet; accessed 8 Mar 2005. 
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Korea, U.S. sway over that long time ally began to wane.15 Similarly, Chinese investment 
in major infrastructure projects throughout the Philippines, such as rail lines in central 
Luzon, will have a similar effect of reducing the benefits of following Washington’s lead 
on various topics of mutual interest and concern.16 Direct military sales and financial aid, 
in addition to extensive cooperation between Chinese and Burmese business interests, has 
solidified PRC hold over that country’s government, a junta that has been long beyond 
the U.S. government’s influence.17 Geographic proximity, cultural affinity and historic 
relationships put China at a distinct advantage over the United States in its ability to 
shape the political landscape of East and Southeast Asia. As China becomes less 
belligerent, offering incentives for cooperation instead of issuing demands and threats, 
PRC soft power will grow further still and eventually supplant the United States as the 
dominant political influence in the western Pacific. 
Security cooperation and political engagement provide exceptional opportunities 
for averting the eventuality of diminishing U.S. influence in Asia. By remaining engaged 
in the region through military exercises, disaster relief, counter-drug and counter-
terrorism efforts, the United States demonstrates an enduring commitment to the well-
being of Asia’s developing nations and the various transitional democracies struggling to 
consolidate their rule. Policies of containment or isolationism are counterproductive to 
the achievement of U.S. interests in the region and strategies that discourage these 
xenophobic attitudes must be pursued, if the United States is to remain a valued partner in 
East Asian commerce and political discourse. Military exchange programs and 
confidence building exercises with various Asian partners will be invaluable in 
demonstrating the United States’ enduring commitment to the region and revealing 
America’s strategic intention to remain an active participant in East and Southeast Asian 
affairs. By engaging with the PLA, the United States government reveals its willingness 
 
15 Scott Snyder and Ah Young Kim, “Special Annual Issue ‘China-ROK-U.S. Relations and Regional 
Security in Northeast Asia,” Center for Strategic and International Studies Pacific Forum - Comparative 
Connections (July 2003). [On-line] available from: http://www.csis.org/pacfor/annual/2003_report.pdf; 
Internet; accessed 8 Mar 2005. 
16 “GMA is Back from China with $1 Billion Worth of New Investments, other Business Pacts,” 
Office of the Press Secretary – Manila, Philippines, 4 September 2004; [On-line] available from: 
http://www.news.ops.gov.ph/archives2004/sept04.htm; Internet; accessed 8 Mar 2005. 
17 “Special Report: Jiang Zemin’s Burma Trip (12-15 December 2001)” Virtual Information Center, 
17 December 2001; [On-line] available from:  http://www.vic-
info.org/RegionsTop.nsf/0/264dd2f145ba57730a256b2500736e07; Internet; accessed 8 Mar 2005.  
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to cooperate and compromise on issues of mutual concern. Instead of using the time-
tested practice of suspending high-level military talks in response to the crisis du jour, if 
the United States were to use scheduled meetings to discuss sources of discord on 
particular policy decisions, DoD seniors could build mutual trust with their counterparts 
at the PRC Ministry of Defense, Central Military Commission, and PLA Headquarters. 
By unilaterally extending this olive branch of continued cooperation during future crises, 
the United States can engender an environment of empathic good faith such that the PRC 
may be less inclined to suspend military-to-military relations in the reactionary fashion of 
the past. 
B. MAJOR REGIONAL TRENDS 
Strategic trends in China’s economic growth, political stability and military build-
up reveal a nation rising to major regional power status within the next decade. While 
Beijing has begun efforts to slow China’s economic growth to reduce the effects of 
inflation, increases in gross domestic product (GDP) exceeding any other large economy 
on earth are expected to continue for the foreseeable future. Anti-corruption campaigns 
within the CCP and efforts to build intra-party democracy and open elections of political 
leadership below province level may all combine to provide a stabilizing effect on civil 
society, build domestic support for CCP single party rule and enhance PRC political 
prestige throughout the region. Additionally, present trends in China’s military force 
modernization, officer corps professionalization, and the PLA’s regional influence as a 
political force will combine to create a substantial source of concern for U.S. policy 
makers and military leaders.18  
1. Build-Up and Modernization for Cross-Strait Operations 
The most destabilizing of recent trends in East Asia is the rapid build-up of PLA 
initial strike capability in Fujian Province, opposite Taiwan, and the apparent goal of 
specific military modernization efforts on-going throughout the PLA, PLA Air Force 
(PLAAF) and PLA Navy (PLAN). In order to maintain a viable coercive force to deter 
Taiwanese independence, the PLA has deployed in excess of 450 conventional surface-
 
18 David Isenberg, “The PLA, the Pentagon, and Politics.” Asia Times On-line, 18 July 2002; [On-
line] available from: http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/DG18Ad03.html; Internet; accessed 8 Mar 
2005. 
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to-surface missiles (SSMs) well within range of most major military, political and key 
infrastructure targets throughout the island. At the rate of production reported by various 
sources, many analysts project the number of deployed missile systems to increase 
beyond 600 by the year 2005.19 Of primary concern is that this force’s preemptive strike 
capability could enable the PLA to achieve victory over the greatly outnumbered 
Taiwanese military before the United States could bring sufficient forces to bear to repel 
an invasion. Furthermore, the purchase, and continuing delivery, of Russian-built Su-27 
and Su-30 third generation fighter aircraft has enabled rapid modernization of the PLAAF 
air superiority and tactical strike capabilities.20 Paired with advanced AA-12 Adder air-
to-air missiles and a significant stock of precision guided munitions (PGMs), these newly 
acquired weapon systems provide the first leg of a high-tech area denial capability 
specifically designed to defend against U.S. intervention against possible invasion.  
The second weapon system in this modernization effort is the Sovremenny-class 
guided missile destroyer and its extremely capable anti-ship missile, the SS-N-22 
Sunburn. These ships, also purchased from Russia, do not compare with Taiwanese or 
U.S. destroyers in terms of anti-air warfare, but the Sunburn missile was specifically 
designed to target U.S. aircraft carriers and will be a force to contend with before carrier 
strike groups can engage in Taiwan’s defense.21 Finally, while the surface and air 
capabilities of both the PRC and Taiwan are comparable (with PLA numerical superiority 
often offsetting Taiwanese technological advantage), recent additions to the PLAN 
subsurface warfare capability represent a substantial advantage for the PRC under the 
Taiwan Strait. Four Kilo-class diesel submarines, acquired from Russia in the mid-1990s, 
are quieter and more capable of establishing no-go zones for U.S. carrier strike groups for 
the potentially short period of time required to provide the world with a fait accompli 
invasion by PLA forces.22 These trends in force procurement and modernization will 
continue  for  the  foreseeable  future  and,  if  it  is  to avert their use against Taiwan, the  
 
19 Bill Gertz, “China Points More Missiles at Taiwan.” Washington Times, 23 November 1999; [On-
line] available from: http://www.taiwandc.org/washt9905.htm; Internet; accessed 8 Mar 2005. 
20 David Shambaugh, Modernizing China’s Military: Progress, Problems and Prospects (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2002), 262. 
21 Ibid, 267. 
22 Ibid, 273. 
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United States must continue to support the maintenance of the status quo with regard to 
Taiwan’s nebulous standing as neither a nation-state nor an subservient province under 
CCP rule. 
2. Officer Corps Professionalization 
Since 1978, the PLA has implemented significant reforms to its weapons 
inventory, rank system and organizational structure. Sweeping changes were necessary in 
order to undo many of the systemic failings caused by decades of diplomatic and 
economic isolation, the disintegration of the military’s core competencies during the 
Cultural Revolution, and hard-line Maoist doctrine that favored political criteria over 
technological expertise in PLA leadership.23 Under Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin and 
now Hu Jintao, the PLA officer corps has developed from a highly dedicated, yet poorly 
trained, cadre leading teeming masses of incapable troops, into highly-specialized, 
technically-adept, leaders of a downsized, but well-trained, military force.24 This trend 
represents both a potential challenge and a significant opportunity for the United States 
government and DoD personnel responsible for implementing U.S. China policy. 
As the PLA officer corps becomes more educated, the overall capability of the 
PRC armed forces will be greatly magnified. In-depth training on the employment of the 
advanced weapons systems purchased from abroad will allow combat pilots and naval 
warfare specialists to utilize new aircraft, ships and submarines to their full potential. 
Advanced management and logistics techniques will make the PRC art of war into a 
science of efficient application of force, manpower and resources to achieve tactical and 
strategic goals.25 This effort to educate has been accompanied by campaigns to 
depoliticize the officer corps, reduce corruption throughout the ranks and eliminate 
ancillary tasks (such as managing commercial ventures) from the PLA’s core 
responsibilities, in order to allow the military to focus on its mission of protecting the 
homeland and supporting the state’s foreign policy agenda.26 By reducing the strength of 
 
23 Macfarquhar, 376. 
24 James C. Mulvenon, Professionalization of the Senior Chinese Officer Corps: Trends and 
Implications (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1997), 77. 
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Political Role of the Military in Asia, ed. Muthiah Alagappa (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001), 
329. 
12 
                                                
these distracting influences, the PRC government has created a focused, proficient and 
professional military force capable of projecting state power beyond its national borders. 
As such, for many American policymakers, the modern PLA represents a real threat to 
the achievement of U.S. national interests in the region, but it will also act as a stabilizing 
force both within China and throughout the region.27
During these recent decades of defense reform and political liberalization, the 
PLA senior officer corps has become younger, more technically specialized and less 
politically active. Barring any major change in the Taiwan question, these characteristics 
may inculcate a less belligerent outlook toward the U.S. government and its allies in the 
Asia-Pacific area. This may, in turn, provide common ground from which stable military-
to-military relations can grow into cooperative efforts to further reduce historic cultural 
and ideological antagonistic sentiments that still exist between the United States and 
China. Furthermore, increased levels of professionalism throughout the PLA ranks may 
generate a greater sense of responsibility to the common citizenry of the PRC that will 
reduce the military’s role in suppressing domestic political dissenters and popular 
protests such as the uprising in Tiananmen Square in 1989. Cultivating this leadership 
development trend in the PLA is a precarious proposition, with both potential costs and 
promising benefits to U.S. foreign policy initiatives in East and Southeast Asia in the 
coming decades. 
3. Expansion of Regional Political-Military Influence 
In recent years, the PRC’s Ministry of Defense has extended its relations with 
counterpart institutions of its neighboring countries and friendly states throughout the 
Third World.28 China has sent high level emissaries of its defense establishment to 
engage foreign heads of state and their military representatives in constructive 
discussions with increasing frequency and expanding the scope of many security 
cooperation agreements with key nations in Asia. An example of these strengthening ties 
can be found in recent Shanghai Cooperative Organization (SCO) exercises with China’s 
 
27 You Ji. “China: From Revolutionary Tool to Professional Military,” in Military Professionalism in 
Asia: Concepts and Empirical Perspectives, ed. Muthiah Alagappa (Honolulu: East West Center, 2001), 
129. 
28 PRC State Council Information Office, China's National Defense in 2004. (December 2004); [On-
line] available from: http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/whitepaper/defense2004/defense2004.html; Internet; 
accessed 23 Jan 2005. 
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Central Asian co-members designed to build mutually reinforcing operations procedures 
and force structures for dealing with terrorism and insurgencies in the western PRC 
province of Xinjiang.29 Furthermore, combined naval exercises with Russia and joint sea 
rescue operations with Pakistan demonstrate a deepening of military diplomacy and 
collective security institution building in response to a perceived expansion of U.S. armed 
activism and hegemonic tendencies.30 While not as yet a direct threat to U.S. engagement 
policies with nations in the region, China’s expanding defense collaboration efforts 
represent an alternative to the United States that less powerful regional actors can turn to 
when an alliance with America proves undesirable. Vigilant and conciliatory engagement 
with nations on China’s periphery will become more and more necessary to counteract 
this trend that could constitute the development of an Asian power bloc set in opposition 
to U.S. goals in the western Pacific area. 
 
29 “Anti-Terror Center in Central Asia to be Launched.” Reuters, 24 September 2003; [On-line] 
available from: http://www.etaiwannews.com/China/2003/09/24/1064368244.htm; Internet; accessed 23 
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II. CONTAINMENT VERSUS ENGAGEMENT  
The ongoing debate in the United States concerning military relations with the 
People’s Republic of China revolves around the benefits and risks entailed in either of 
two dominant paradigms. Given many long years of Cold War ‘containment’ policy 
directed against the spread of communism and its apparent threat to the fundamental 
ideals of American democracy, it is little surprise that vestiges of this exclusionary 
mentality remain in today’s vastly altered global political environment. By applying a 
realist approach to analyzing the changing world order, the United States can achieve 
some benefits by containing China’s economic, political and military rise in the coming 
decades.31 However, the high costs that the U.S. government would invoke through 
adherence to this antiquated policy would far outweigh its benefits in a post-Cold War 
age of highly integrated global economies and the inevitable intertwining of national 
interests that it brings. The tangible economic benefits of positive relations with the PRC 
shared by American consumers would undermine efforts to build a domestic consensus 
against China’s peaceful rise. Furthermore, broad ranging efforts to isolate the PRC 
would also require the backing of many, if not all, of China’s neighbors, allies and 
trading partners to ensure that modernization (both military and technological) were 
stymied for the foreseeable future.32
Similarly, comprehensive engagement policies are highly controversial in the 
United States due to the perception that economic, technical and military cooperation 
with the PRC only serves to strengthen a potential adversary in ways that directly 
undermine U.S. national security. Arguments against constructive engagement policies 
with regard to improved economic and political relations with the PRC were especially 
high in the wake of reports of China’s efforts to obtain U.S. nuclear weapons design 
information through espionage.33 However, efforts to engage China throughout the 1980s 
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and 1990s represented significant steps forward in promoting China’s incorporation into 
global economic and political institutions on terms consistent with U.S. policy designs.34 
Each of these two approaches has significant costs and benefits for the future of U.S. 
interests in Asia, and yet the choice to proceed along one line of policy versus the other 
tends to rely strongly on perceptions of China as a threat to the American way of life or 
as a benevolent partner in the development of pan-Pacific economic prosperity and the 
promotion of democratic principles and basic human rights. During the coming decade, 
U.S. and Chinese leaders will continue to build political and economic relationships that 
benefit their respective national interests and conform to personal paradigms concerning 
the level of threat their opposite number poses to the achievement of national goals. 
A. CONTAINMENT  
Throughout the Cold War, the United States applied significant political and 
military pressure to ensure that communism did not spread beyond the confines of the 
Soviet Union and its satellite nations. When Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalist forces failed 
to consolidate power, lost the bloody civil war against Mao Tse-tung’s Communist army 
and fled to Formosa, American policy-makers embarked on an invasive search for the 
culprit responsible for “losing China”. Continuing diplomatic recognition of Chiang’s 
regime as the legal government of mainland China, prosecuting the Korean War in order 
to roll back the Soviet and Chinese-backed invasion of southern Korea and isolating the 
PRC from the rapidly intertwining global economy were but a few of the tools applied to 
limit Mao’s ability to spread his ideology in the 1950s and early 1960s. Building on the 
Truman Doctrine, which thrust the United States into its role as protector of “free peoples 
who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures,"35 
Presidents Truman and Eisenhower applied the evolving principles of containment to 
supporting anti-communist forces in Southeast Asia, most openly in Vietnam. While 
direct combat with the PLA ended with the Korean Armistice, military confrontation and 
the threat of conflict would continue with regard to U.S. support of the Republic of China 
on Taiwan.  
 
34 Nicholas R. Lardy, “Issues in China's WTO Accession,” The U.S.-China Security Review 
Commission (May 9, 2001); [On-line] available from: 
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35 Harry S. Truman. Speech before a Joint Session of Congress. 12 March 1947. [On-line]; available 
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During the Taiwan Straits crises of 1954-55 and 1958, the United States implied 
that the use of nuclear weapons and massive conventional forces were viable options for 
defending its national interests in East Asia, namely its unique relationship with Chiang 
Kai-shek’s Nationalist government. While these crises ended in compromise and de-
escalation, both events intensified feelings of national animosity that would undermine 
efforts at peaceful coexistence over the course of the next twenty years.  Throughout this 
period, the proxy war that emerged in Vietnam after America’s substantial build-up and 
support of the Republic of South Vietnam evolved into an all out struggle to limit 
Chinese and Soviet influence in the developing world. Over the course of the 1960s, the 
Kennedy and Johnson Administrations continued to apply the U.S. military in a 
containment role throughout continental and insular Southeast Asia. American combat 
operations against PRC-supported North Vietnam were complemented by extensive 
military engagement with the Kingdom of Thailand and the Republic of the Philippines, 
thus denying the PRC influence in the region and firmly entrenching those allies in the 
Cold War struggle for power.  
1. Costs of Containment 
While the global political environment of the 21st century has moved beyond the 
nuclear brinksmanship of the Cold War, many American and Chinese policy-makers still 
weigh relative gains and losses of international prestige, political influence or economic 
benefits using the same outdated metrics as were used over fifty years ago. Today, the 
costs of constraining or deterring China from developing relationships with its neighbors 
and expanding its economy to include extensive trade with the industrialized nations of 
the world must be calculated within a dynamic new international system.36 Given the 
wide range of multinational corporations and nongovernmental organizations with 
sufficient power to influence the direction of global industrial development and the 
increased worldwide interconnectivity made possible by information age technologies, 
using the antiquated litmus test of maintaining the balance-of-power status quo appears 
ludicrous. The global market economy has enabled increased quality of life in developing 
nations, including significant benefits to the underemployed masses in China, reduced 
costs on a wide variety of products once produced in the costly labor markets of the 
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developed world and brought cultures closer together through commerce and peaceful 
interaction. Containing China, one of the world’s most dynamic and growing economies 
would significantly retard these trends and cause a significant stagnation in the global 
market as well as reduce the liberalizing effects of a rapidly growing middle class. As 
many newly industrialized countries have discovered, the influence of businessmen, 
urban professionals and a civically responsible middle class can act as a powerful 
stabilizing force in an unconsolidated democracy and a strong motivator for autocratic 
regimes to honor the demands of its citizenry. 
Added to the international economic and political destabilizing effects of an 
American containment policy of China, the use of the U.S. military to implement this 
program will create contentious situations and build tensions that could easily bring about 
the East Asian crisis that both sides presently work diligently to avoid.37 As demonstrated 
in the EP-3 incident of 2001, bringing U.S. military forces and the PLA in close 
proximity in an antagonistic posture can lead to a rapid decline in relations and a 
potential escalatory spiral in domestic nationalism that demands a confrontation. By 
removing the possibility of resolving the Taiwan question through peaceful discourse, 
implementing a military encirclement program using regional basing and strengthened 
alliances and breaking off security dialogue through which misunderstanding and 
miscommunications are eliminated, the United States may back the PRC into a position 
from which reunification by force is the only option. Furthermore, in the present defense 
posture and national security environment that places global anti-terror operations at the 
top of the list of military priorities, too few forces are available to implement a successful 
military confrontation with a determined PLA organization. Necessary increases in 
American defense spending, already at record highs due to Global War on Terror 
operations and the occupation of Iraq, would act as a drain on the nation’s productive 
capacities and further delay recovery from the post-September 11th economic recession. 
2. Benefits of Containment 
Taken in terms of absolute global influence, China’s industrial, political and 
military modernization efforts of the past thirty years present a direct challenge to U.S. 
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dominance of the international balance of power as it has existed since the collapse of the 
Soviet Union. Proponents of a modern day containment policy purport that the PRC 
views the western-centric restructuring of the global market economy and redistribution 
of resources following World War II as inherently biased against China taking its rightful 
place as a dominant force in East Asia. This sentiment is repeated often in Mao’s rhetoric 
railing against capitalist imperialism and Western domination of the existing international 
order.38 Furthermore, similar arguments point to China as a “non-status quo” power 
constantly disregarding established norms and rules of the game.39 Viewed in this light, a 
policy of comprehensive containment, with an aggressive military posture at its core, 
appears to be the best possible solution to maintaining American dominance in the 
international system of nations. Containment would force China to return to an inefficient 
system of autarky which would effectively halt the rapid economic growth trend that has 
become the norm during the past decade. 
Proponents of a revived policy of PRC containment cite seemingly endless 
examples of Chinese perfidy, subversion and insincerity in their foreign relations with the 
United States as overwhelming justification for an aggressive posture against the world’s 
last major communist power. 
The People’s Republic of China is the most serious national security threat 
the United States faces at present and will remain so into the foreseeable 
future. This grave strategic threat includes the disruption of vital U.S. 
interests in the Pacific region and even the possibility of a nuclear war that 
could cost millions of American lives.40
Manipulation of Chinese domestic press to foment anti-American sentiments among its 
constituency during recent crises, including the Belgrade embassy bombing and EP-3 
collision has also been described by containment advocates as an example of the 
continuing totalitarian nature of communist China and overt evidence that the CCP views 
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the U.S. government as its most dangerous opponent. Furthermore, recent scandals 
revealing PRC involvement in American presidential and congressional election 
financing, business arrangements with the potential to undermine U.S. national security 
and nuclear espionage further incited American domestic political sentiment against 
engagement with ‘Red China’.41
However, this limited perspective ignores many of the political and economic 
realities of today. Enforcing a containment policy would require the cooperation of 
China’s many global trading partners to be successful. Given the high levels of economic 
interdependence between China, Japan, the Republic of Korea, various nations of South 
and Southeast Asia as well as the European Union, this prospect seems extremely remote. 
Furthermore, the PLA’s growing capacity for power projection and the myriad of shared 
interests between the PRC and the various governments of the Asia Pacific region make it 
highly unlikely that China’s neighbors would enter into an openly hostile military 
alliance with the United States. These limited benefits and the low prospect of a 
successful implementation should point American political leaders well away from this 
policy relic of days long gone, yet core cultural differences and a history of distrust 
continue to drive a wedge between these two nations that will likely remain for many 
years to come.  
B. ENGAGEMENT  
The future development of military-to-military relationships between China and 
the United States will be based upon threat perceptions and the relative costs and benefits 
that they have for both sides, just as they have in preceding deceades. Since the 
establishment of relations with the PRC during the Nixon Administration, the United 
States has struggled to achieve appropriate levels of military engagement with China. 
Using improved political relations with the PRC to balance against Soviet expansionism 
during the early 1970s served to encourage Russian leaders to explore avenues of détente. 
However, many within the U.S. State Department warned that close military relations 
with China would only serve to ruin the delicate balance between the United States and 
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Soviet Union. Given these sets of restraints, it is little wonder that military cooperation 
during the Nixon and Ford Administrations were primarily limited to,  
…American statements of support for Chinese security against a Soviet 
attack and Chinese cooperation with American regional policy toward 
Korea, Japan, and Indochina.42
Likewise, during the Carter Administration, military cooperation was primarily limited to 
those exchanges, delegations and information sharing programs that would bolster 
China’s ability to resist Soviet influence, but not disrupt the Cold War balance of 
power.43 Even after normalization of relations in 1979, efforts to expand the security 
relationship between the United States and China proved to be illusory machinations 
meant to deter Soviet aggression without substantial commitment on the part of either 
Washington or Beijing.44   
 While the success of efforts to improve military relations with China during the 
1980s was limited, the U.S. commitment to do so was finally codified by President 
Reagan’s Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger. The announcement that future 
security cooperation between the United States and the PRC would be based upon the 
“three pillars” of high level visits, functional exchanges and sales of defensive military 
equipment gave structure to a nebulous area of U.S. foreign policy.45 However, American 
popular response to the June 1989 Tiananmen Square incident, wherein PLA forces were 
used to suppress pro-democracy demonstrators, caused President George H.W. Bush to 
suspended military-to-military exchanges as part of a massive sanctions package.46 Even 
though China’s diplomatic cooperation leading up to Operation DESERT STORM 
yielded a short reprieve from vocal condemnation by the American public and high-level 
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military contacts resumed shortly thereafter, the precedent for an ad hoc start-and-stop 
program of security cooperation had been set.  
During President Clinton’s first term in office, Secretary of Defense William 
Perry initiated the most significant PLA engagement plans to date on the grounds that, 
Our security posture dramatically improves if China cooperates with us. In 
order to regain that cooperation, we must rebuild mutual trust and 
understanding with the PLA, and this could only happen through high-
level dialogue and working level contacts.47
Because U.S.-PRC security relations held a position of prominence within President 
Clinton’s comprehensive engagement program, military-to-military contacts were able to 
withstand the strain of the June 1995 visit of Taiwanese President Lee Teng-hui’s visit to 
Cornell University and the subsequent PLA missile tests conducted in the waters near 
Taipei in July. While this series of events was not accompanied by a halting of military 
visits, further missile tests in March 1996, meant to dissuade the Taiwanese public from 
re-electing President Lee, were met with a six-month cessation of exchanges (as well as 
the presence of two American carrier battle groups in the Philippine Sea).48 Likewise, the 
cancellation of several key military-to-military events after the May 1999 inadvertent 
bombing of the PRC embassy in Belgrade, Yugoslavia by American forces operating 
against the Milosevic regime was short lived. It follows that Deputy Assistant Secretary 
of Defense Kurt Campbell’s November 1999 visit to Beijing should have heralded a 
return to previously high levels of security cooperation between American and Chinese 
military officials.49 However, this would not be the case. Due to U.S. domestic political 
fallout from the nuclear espionage issue and continuing concerns about PRC long-term 
goals, Congress implemented highly restrictive controls on future military exchanges 
with the PLA in the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) of 2000.50  
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These controls remained in place throughout the first George W. Bush presidency 
and were integrated into a standing Pentagon review and approval process which allowed 
a semblance of regularity to contacts between U.S. and Chinese military personnel. While 
the U.S. Navy EP-3 Orion surveillance plane incident of April 2001 caused a short period 
of high tension between the two governments, military contacts were halted only briefly 
and then allowed to continue on a case-by-case basis by Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld. 
Among the substantive meetings held in the months following the EP-3 incident was the 
September 2001 discussion of how to avoid future incidents of this type held under the 
auspices of the Military Maritime Consultative Agreement.51 Lastly, the September 11 
2001 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center provided a new potential foundation for 
U.S.-PRC relations in the 21st century. Given the perceived common threat of global 
terrorist organizations, both U.S. policymakers and top PRC leadership began to 
recognize the mutual benefit of combining efforts against this new foe.52 While 
intelligence sharing and consultation on terrorist movements in Central and Southeast 
Asia continued throughout President Bush’s first term of office,53 building a broad-
ranging, cooperative relationship between the Department of Defense and the PLA will 
require years of confidence building measures before an environment of mutual trust will 
be solidified.  
1. Costs of Engagement 
Throughout the Clinton presidency, a wide spectrum of media reporting and 
Congressional findings condemned defense cooperation elements of the White House’s 
comprehensive engagement program for undermining U.S. national security. The 1999 
Report of the U.S. House of Representatives Select Committee on U.S. National Security 
and Military/Commercial Concerns with the People’s Republic of China (better known as 
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the Cox Report) recognized a number of practices in U.S.-PRC relations that significantly 
harmed American national interests.54 Specific examples of PLA modernization efforts 
based either upon available U.S. doctrine or specific information exchange sessions led 
many policy pundits to regard broad-ranging security cooperation with China as efforts to 
empower a future enemy. For example, observations of U.S. military operations since 
1991, as well as PLA requests for information regarding U.S. advanced defense logistics 
procedures and organization, resulted in a major restructuring of the PLA General 
Logistics Department.55 While cooperation between the PLA Air Force (PLAAF), the US 
Air Force (USAF) and the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has made 
Chinese civil aviation safer and more efficient in recent years, accusations of parallel 
efforts to significantly improve PLAAF combat capability cast doubts on the wisdom of 
this engagement program as well.56  
Given the rise of Chinese military power over the past decade and the potential 
for direct conflict between the United States and PRC over the Taiwan issue, supporting 
the repressive communist government’s ability to more effectively impose its will on 
smaller regional powers through force appears counterproductive. Providing the PLA 
insight into the full spectrum of Defense Department tactical, operational and strategic 
military capabilities could undermine American ability to defend its interests in East Asia 
and maintain the dominant U.S. position in the Asia Pacific region. Added to this are 
continuing assertions of a lack of reciprocal treatment in military relations for which 
many cannot see a benefit for the United States.57 However, given the growing economic 
interdependence between these two nations, the expanding cultural ties between their 
citizens, and the recognized social and political detriments that armed conflict between 
America and China would bring, cooperation in the security arena, regardless of losses in 
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absolute military power, is warranted. As political, economic and civil-military relations 
reforms take hold in 21st century China, American expectations for responsible behavior 
in PRC domestic and international affairs may begin to be realized. U.S. engagement 
with the PLA, as well as mutual exposure to each side’s decision-making processes and 
organizational structures will also prevent disastrous miscalculations and 
miscommunications as we proceed into a dangerous period for pan-Pacific relations. 
2. Benefits of Engagement 
 Strategic discourse between high-level officials of the U.S. and PRC governments 
over the past three decades has paid significant dividends in areas of mutual interest. 
Among these are changing patterns in PRC adherence to international conventions 
regarding the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and arms trafficking to 
developing nations listed as areas of concern by Pentagon.58 By engaging in open 
discourse under such constructs as the Military Maritime Consultative Agreement, each 
nation not only addresses functional issues of concern, both parties alter their 
expectations regarding the behavior of their opposite number. However, high-level 
discussions can often be undermined by intransigent attitudes from either of the 
participants. Much of U.S. engagement policy during the first Clinton Administration was 
based on the premise that economic and security cooperation would force China to accept 
Western approved policy positions through the judicious application of pressures and 
inducements.59 In this environment, PRC leaders had a strong tendency to resist such 
efforts to modify their behavior as most policymakers viewed the bilateral relationship as 
a zero-sum game; any political gains by the United States represented a loss of regional 
influence or national face. Given a relationship that has long been highly charged with 
domestic nationalist forces demanding hard-line stances against appeasement or the 
humiliation of political capitulation, it is little wonder that the past quarter century of 
official diplomatic relations have done little to abate the general feelings of distrust 
shared by both sides. 
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 Many proponents of U.S.-PRC military engagement have been disappointed by 
the lack of overt gain achieved over the course of recent decades, especially in areas of 
direct influence on key decisions or enhanced communication during times of crisis.60 
However, in addition to the aforementioned progress in weapons non-proliferation, 
including PRC acceptance of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and promises to adhere 
to the restrictions set forth in the Missile Technology Control Regime, military exchanges 
and interlocution have developed mutual recognition of each side’s capabilities and level 
of professionalism. Furthermore, continuous requests for increased transparency in this 
most important of security relationships by the United States and the Association for 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum (ARF) have resulted in the PLA 
publication of four “white papers” on China’s national security priorities and concerns.61 
This movement toward accepting the norms of behavior in foreign policy and security 
affairs established by the Western-dominated international system brings the PRC closer 
to the American preconceived notion of a responsible nation-state and bodes well for 
potential partnership in other areas of mutual interest. By improving military relations 
with the PLA, the United States can further its own national interests while promoting a 
new paradigm in security cooperation not constrained by Cold War concepts such as 
“zero-sum” diplomacy and “balance of power” politics. 
C. OBSTACLES AND CHALLENGES 
Throughout the short history of U.S.-PRC relations, Department of Defense 
efforts to expand military relations with the PLA have faced significant hurdles from both 
sides of the Pacific. Even prior to the establishment of the communist government, U.S. 
policy-makers and security specialists were divided over how best to interact with Mao 
Tse-tung’s forces during the later years of World War II.62 During the campaign against 
the Japanese occupation of China, General Joseph Stillwell recognized the potential 
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benefit Mao’s insurgency could hold for Allied operations in the Pacific and lobbied 
President Roosevelt to authorize a group of liaison officers to engage with the 
communists to assess their capabilities. Given the total war mindset of 1944, it was little 
wonder that the President authorized this mission and took advantage of any possible 
opportunity to turn the balance in Asia in favor of the Allied Powers. However, even as 
the mission began to report on the strength of the communist position behind Japanese 
lines and the positive local response that Mao’s approach to engendering the good will of 
villages under their sway, political forces in Washington shifted against the pro-
communist line and solidified behind the Nationalist Chinese under Chiang Kai-shek. 
This “Dixie Mission” to liaise with the Yenan insurgents held the potential to 
create an era of peaceful engagement between the communist Chinese and the United 
States military, yet differences in ideology overrode pragmatic concerns in the waning 
days of World War II. Likewise, countervailing ideologies, miscommunications and 
issues of core national interest thrust U.S. forces and the PLA into direct combat on the 
Korean Peninsula and indirect conflict in Vietnam over the course of the following three 
decades. Later, ideological differences began to soften with the moderating influence of 
Deng Xiaoping’s opening to the West. His reform policies, designed to bring the PRC 
economy, industrial base and military forces in line with the predominant measures of 
modern national success began the process of integrating China into the global economy 
and diplomatic, cultural and military exchanges with the United States saw significant 
expansion during the late 1970s and 1980s. The Tiananmen Square incident of 1989 
reminded the American people of the gulf of ideological and cultural differences between 
themselves and the PRC government and this hurdle has proven nearly insurmountable in 
recent years.  
During the 1990s, the removal of the Soviet threat to American national interests 
eliminated the need to play “the China card” to balance against Russian expansion. The 
collapse of the Soviet Union caused a shift in U.S. policy-makers’ tolerance for 
engagement with “Red China,” especially in light of its continued repression of 
democratic movements and religious groups due to their perceived threat to continued 
CCP rule. Most recently, the primary obstacle to positive relations between the United 
States and PRC has been each nation’s relations with the Republic of China (ROC) on 
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Taiwan. While the 1995-96 Taiwan Straits crisis exacerbated American fears of a 
growing threat of PRC regional hegemony and its expanding military capacity to 
influence the Asian balance of power, the continuing U.S. policy of providing defensive 
arms to the ROC is a constant point of contention with the PRC government.63 These 
strategic issues of contending national interests establish the tense environment within 
which U.S.-PRC military-to-military relations must operate. However, there are several 
procedural and cultural barriers to establishing meaningful and sustained security 
dialogue that have yet to be overcome. 
1. Reciprocity 
A recurring theme in American military engagement circles refers to a lack of 
reciprocity in the number, type and quality of exchanges between the United States and 
China.  
The PLA carefully orchestrates its bilateral exchanges to maximize 
benefits for itself and, through use of limited reciprocity and transparency, 
to minimize the amount of information the PLA provides to other 
countries.64
American Defense Attaché Officers and high-level military officials complain of repeated 
visits to PLA showcase units of little or no strategic value and functional level exchanges 
that reveal nothing of the capabilities or intentions of the China defense sector. Similarly, 
many foreign policy pundits in the United States denigrate Pentagon engagement efforts 
as providing deep insight into American operational capabilities and strategic doctrine 
and argue that these exchanges should be severely curtailed.65 Furthermore, American 
military observers have had difficulty in securing invitations to advanced war fighting 
exercises, such as the massive “Iron Fist” division-level live-fire event held at Queshan 
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Training Base in Henan province in September 2004.66 Conversely, PLA dignitaries and 
functional experts have received numerous opportunities to observe war fighting training 
events, such as the U.S. Air Force’s “Red Flag” exercises, U.S. Marine Corps combined 
arms live-fire events and maneuvers at the U.S. Army’s National Training Center.67 For 
many U.S. policy-makers, this lack of forthrightness alone is enough to bring out latent 
feelings of mistrust and provides sufficient validation for proponents of the “China 
Threat” paradigm to legislate significant restrictions on future engagement efforts. 
 While this restrictive behavior may seem prudent in order to coerce a truculent 
adversary into conforming to American expectations, eliminating opportunities to engage 
in security dialogue restricts both nations’ abilities to develop trust and a firm 
comprehension of the other’s motives. In the case of limited reciprocity, PLA officials 
offer many excuses for their apparent lack of cooperation, some of which are little more 
than superficial justifications based on inadequate logistics support for high level visits. 
Chinese defense officials may feel that substandard equipment and poor quality facilities 
harbor the potential for loss of face and provide damaging revelations concerning the 
state of readiness of PLA operational forces. Further, the limited number of elite Army, 
Navy and Air Force units with advanced combat capabilities comparable to those of the 
U.S. military may also cause Beijing to view these resources as key national assets whose 
true capabilities are best kept opaque to a potential adversary. While the underlying 
motivations for this reluctance to reciprocate visits or provide requested information may 
shed some light on the issue, they do not reveal a means of overcoming American 
government resistance to continued openness of a seemingly one-sided nature. Only by 
reaping tangible benefits from this relationship in the short term will the opinion of the 
American public, and that of their elected representatives, turn from the path of 
disassociation and limited military engagement.  
2. Transparency 
Closely related to American concerns of non-reciprocal behavior in the military-
to-military relationship with China is the continued lack of transparency in a broad range 
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of issue areas, such as the PLA’s strategic intent, management structure, procurement 
practices and budgetary activities. From a PRC perspective, it may seem like a reasonable 
hedge against America’s unstable foreign policy towards Asia, which threatens complete 
reversals with each passing administration,68 to withhold certain defense information in 
order to maintain an ambiguous position as a deterrent to the United States’ new-found 
unilateralist tendencies. Clashes over definitions of transparency may not drive American 
and Chinese military forces into violent conflict, but they do heighten some of the basic 
societal and cultural differences that create the near endless cycle of distrust and 
withdrawal. First, let us consider that the United States’ present dominant position in the 
global balance-of-power encourages a desire to perpetuate Pax Americana and spread 
Western-style democracy to the four corners of the earth.69 This push for global 
democracy has received a significant boost from the Bush Administration’s response to 
the September 11th 2001 terrorist attacks. Operation IRAQI FREEDOM most effectively 
demonstrated America’s ability and will to forcibly remove an authoritarian regime from 
the government of another nation in order to promote its own national security 
irrespective of issues of sovereignty. Next, consider that the People’s Republic of China 
as the sole remaining non-democratic great power has a history of using diplomatic guile 
to achieve political-military objectives and desires to challenge the status quo of the 
modern international system of nations.70 Added to this are diametrically-opposed 
priorities and definitions of civil liberties that influence the lengths to which each society 
will go in order to foster openness or curtail civic freedom in order to maintain social and 
political order.71  
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For American citizens, military leaders and policy-makers, transparency in 
government is a common tool used to build popular support for executive orders, 
domestic legislation or military operations prior to their execution. In contrast, the PRC’s 
single party system, revolutionary origins and an enduring awareness of social and 
political forces pulling at the very fabric of their state lead the central authorities to 
tightly control the flow of information to its people and the outside world. The attendant 
paranoia that this siege mentality produces is a primary cause of tight-lipped responses 
from members of the PLA involved in security dialogue with American military 
personnel. Furthermore, broad-scope state security regulations reinforce this mindset and 
provide significant disincentives to PLA exchange officers developing responses to 
queries from their opposite number in the United States.72  
Added to the wide spectrum of strategic differences between the PRC and 
American governments, these procedural hindrances often undermine security 
cooperation efforts to the point that little substantial progress is made toward achieving 
common goals. However, some U.S. military officials previously involved in security 
dialogue and liaison efforts relate that a significant portion of this negative perception of 
PLA transparency could be overcome by eliminating inefficiencies in the exchange 
process.73 In the past, poor preparation of personnel participating in country visits has 
often led to unproductive meetings and a whimsical approach to gathering information 
about the PLA, its organization or operations. Lack of advance submission of questions 
likely to be asked by high-level officials during their visits also reinforces the Chinese 
propensity to be evasive in their responses due to the lack of formal release approval by 
the chain of command and central party authorities. Lastly, the practice of sending senior 
officials who are rapidly approaching retirement on exchange visits both minimizes the 
benefit of established personal connections and sends the message that these visits are of 
little functional importance to the long-term interests of the United States.  
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III. U.S. ENGAGEMENT WITH TAIWAN 
A. HISTORY OF U.S. MILITARY RELATIONS WITH THE REPUBLIC OF 
CHINA (ROC) ON TAIWAN  
Modern American military engagement with the Republic of China (ROC) on 
Taiwan is a complex relationship that began during a time of political upheaval and 
international crisis. Given the long history of American involvement in Western great 
power struggles to gain commercial advantage over one another in the Orient, locating 
the starting point of defense cooperation between the United States and the Chinese 
nation is a problematic process. Among the earliest programs of American military 
engagement with China were the unsanctioned exploits of the adventurer-turned-General 
Frederick Townsend Ward and his mercenary “Ever-Victorious Army.” While his first 
efforts to form an army to fight the forces of the Taiping Rebellion (for profit and glory) 
involved specifically the recruitment of European naval deserters and renegades, Ward 
laid the foundation for Western-style military training programs for Chinese soldiers that 
exposed thousands of native troops to modern tactics and procedures. As Ward was not 
an American government official, nor did he represent any national interests of the 
United States, this 19th century episode did little to develop positive U.S.-China relations. 
Likewise, one can scarcely describe the military enforcement of America’s trade 
concessions under the “unequal treaties” or the “Boxer Protocol” privilege to 
permanently deploy protective garrisons to Tianjin as positive efforts to build cooperative 
security relationships, yet these early encounters would shape social and political 
perspectives that exist still today.74 Furthermore, the mission of the United States military 
in China from 1901 until 1937 continued to focus on the defense of American 
commercial interests with little regard for developing close working relationships with its 
counterparts within the late-Qing Dynasty forces or the armies of the nascent Republic 
when it was formed in 1912.  
As with most dramatic American policy shifts, constructive military relations with 
the ROC were established during a crisis situation and in direct response to an imminent 
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threat to U.S. national interests. So with the rise of Japanese militancy in the late 1930s, 
American policy-makers began to see their continuing interests in China come under the 
threat of becoming consumed within the ever-growing sphere of influence of the 
Japanese government and its powerful Imperial Army. After the Japanese invasion of 
1937 and its attendant physical attacks on U.S. business interests in Shanghai, American 
political leaders began calling for programs of support for the Chinese people in their 
struggle against the invaders. During this period prior to the American declaration of war 
against Japan, groundwork for subsequent substantial military cooperation efforts was 
laid by Claire Lee Chennault, a retired U.S. Air Force officer under contract to Chiang 
Kai-shek to organize and train the ROC Air Force. Despite his best efforts, Chennault 
could do little to improve the poor state of readiness and Chiang’s wartime capital of 
Chungking was under constant threat of attack by Japanese Air Force units.75 As 
American public opinion increasingly called for support of China and Japanese atrocities 
become more widely known, the United States government overtly breached its notional 
neutrality by establishing a lend-lease program with the ROC and making fighter aircraft 
immediately available for shipment to Generalissimo Chiang’s forces. 
Added to this financial and materiel support, U.S. Army military pilots were 
allowed to “resign” from service and enter into contracts with the ROC as part of 
Chennault’s newly-established America Volunteer Group or “Flying Tigers.” Shortly 
after the United States officially entered the war in the Pacific, General George Stillwell 
was deployed to Chungking to act as both Chiang’s Chief of Staff and commander of all 
U.S. forces in the China-Burma-India Theater. Military setbacks, evolving global 
political priorities and diverging grand strategies between the Generalissimo and his 
American advisors all worked against the development of effective coalition operations 
or training programs. Liaison between Stillwell and Chiang became more and more 
difficult as the American took on command of the Chinese Fifth and Sixth Armies in 
Burma. Insubordination and disregard for the American General’s orders were the modus 
operandi for the Generalissimo’s field commanders and Stillwell’s demands for redress 
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were obfuscated by the Chungking leadership.76 While the realities of the war in progress 
relegated military operations on the Asian continent to a peripheral status, significant 
amounts of materiel and funding continued to flow to the Nationalist government with 
Chiang Kai-shek at its head. Yet neither this modern material nor talented American 
advisors could make up for the lack of sound strategic doctrine, resistance to Stillwell’s 
demands for drastic reorganization or the lack of systemic reform of the Chinese military 
training system. 
Throughout the war, relations between Chennault and Chiang flourished, while 
General Stillwell and his attempts to rebuild the Chinese Army were marginalized and 
criticized. Chiang continued to demand more and more support from President Roosevelt 
while large portions of American money and materiel were siphoned off to enrich corrupt 
government officials, pay-off warlords-turned-Nationalists and supply untrained military 
forces that were withheld from combat against the Japanese to be used against the 
Chinese communists once the war was over. However unsuccessful these wartime 
relations were in their attempts to transform the Nationalist Army, the vast amounts of 
American time and money spent propping up the ROC government and a highly 
successful propaganda campaign in the United States bonded the two countries in a 
security relationship that has continued to today. Concerns about the rise of communism 
across the globe caused American policy makers to shun overtures from Mao Tse-tung’s 
insurgent group and continue providing limited arms, equipment and financing to the 
Nationalist forces as they reinitiated civil war combat operations against one another. By 
1949, Chiang’s government was defeated and forced to retreat to the island of Taiwan, 
yet the long-standing political-military ties between the United States and the ROC had 
solidified to the point that American popular support for the right-wing Chinese 
government demanded continued diplomatic and financial backing in the coming 
decades. 
Throughout the 1950s, Presidents Truman and Eisenhower supported, protected 
and restrained the ROC through the adroit use of diplomacy, economic aid and the U.S. 
military. Interposing U.S. forces between Chiang and Mao during the Korean War 
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ensured that neither party would take advantage of the ongoing conflict to initiate a cross 
Strait invasion and hence escalate the situation beyond the bounds of the Korean 
peninsula.77 The complex interplay of fervent anti-communist domestic sentiments, the 
containment policy espoused by NSC-68 and the open aggression of PRC forces in Korea 
forced American policy-makers to remain true to the Nationalist government of Chiang 
Kai-shek as a beacon of anti-Soviet influence in Asia. During the mid-1960s, however, 
Washington began to grasp the full implications of the Sino-Soviet split and with this 
realization came a reduction in the importance of engagement with Chiang’s 
government.78 Even though America’s Mutual Defense Treaty with the ROC remained in 
place until 1979, the Nixon Administration’s overtures to Beijing became known to the 
public in 1971. While the United States supported the membership of both the PRC and 
ROC in the United Nations, the Taiwan-based government was ousted from the 
international body in order that the communist government could represent all of China’s 
interests to the global forum. 
Pragmatic power politics shaped America’s relationship with Taiwan throughout 
the course of the Cold War, yet the bond between Taipei and Washington could not be 
broken by the abrogation of the Mutual Defense Treaty or diplomatic de-recognition of 
the ROC. Formation of diplomatically downgraded, but functionally equivalent, agencies 
rapidly replaced the American Embassy and its security assistance organizations such 
that state-to-state level dialogue could continue under the guise of non-governmental 
organizations from 1979 on. When the Executive Branch championed defense 
cooperation with China as the appropriate means to contain Soviet aggression in the mid-
1970s, the U.S. Congress took action to ensure that America’s long-standing relationship 
with the ROC would not be discarded. Given that the main focus of the Taiwan Relations 
Act  of  197979 was  to  ensure  the  stability of the region and enhance the security of the  
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ROC regime, it is little wonder that the past quarter century has seen significant military 
engagement efforts between the United States and Taiwan even in the shadow of 
improving relations with the PRC. 
Throughout the 1980s, in compliance with the Joint Sino-American Communiqué 
regarding the Taiwan question, the Reagan Administration sought to reduce arms sales to 
the ROC and succeeded in drawing down weapons sold under the Foreign Military Sales 
program from a 1984 peak of $707 million to approximately $620 million in 1987.80 
However, continued American domestic support for the ROC encouraged a strict 
interpretation of the TRA as overriding any commitments made in the 1982 
Communiqué, so technology transfers under commercial sales programs were allowed to 
increase such that quantitative losses in weapons capabilities were minimized during this 
period. This ambiguous defense policy towards Taiwan would continue throughout the 
remainder of the Cold War in an attempt to hold true to historical obligations to the ROC 
while encouraging the PRC to lean toward the United States in its foreign policy and 
perpetuate China’s alienation from the Soviet Union. While U.S. quasi-diplomatic, 
expansive economic and ambiguous military engagement programs with the ROC were 
not the only point of contention between Washington and Beijing, they contributed 
significantly to the PRC decision to follow an “independent foreign policy” during the 
1980s. This decision to follow its own course independent of either superpower’s lead 
came in concert with the PRC’s stated policy shift toward peaceful reunification with 
Taiwan through the “one country, two systems” initiative.81 While direct military-to-
military exchanges with the ROC declined after de-recognition and abrogation of the 
1954 Mutual Defense Treaty, links between the American and Taiwanese defense 
communities remained unbroken throughout the 1980s and have grown steadily into a 
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B. CONTEMPORARY U.S. MILITARY ENGAGEMENT WITH ROC  
Contemporary American policy posture towards security cooperation with the 
ROC began with a controversial round of arms sales by the George H.W. Bush 
Administration to Taiwan in 1992. Whether in response to the PLAAF acquisition of Su-
27 fighter aircraft from Russia or a desire to bolster the American defense industry, 
President Bush defended his decision to sell 150 F-16 fighter aircraft to the ROC as a 
means to "help maintain peace and stability" in East Asia.82 While PRC officials 
lamented this sale as a direct contradiction to President Reagan’s 1982 Communiqué 
promising not to increase weapons transfers to Taiwan in either qualitative or quantitative 
terms,83 the aircraft transfer and prerequisite training proceeded on schedule and were 
completed in 2001. Over the course of the Clinton Administration, no single weapon sale 
would compare to this transaction, yet Taiwan would continue to be the one of the largest 
customers of American FMS programs for the remainder of the millennium.84 
Furthermore, while equipment sales remained at relatively low levels between 1993 and 
2000, non-hardware exchanges expanded significantly during the same period. This 
increase in number and frequency of military-to-military exchanges between the U.S. 
DoD and the ROC armed forces began after a 1994 Executive Branch policy review 
responded to reported shortfalls in Taiwan’s ability to defend itself from a determined 
PLA attack.85 Expansive functional-level talks with ROC forces sought to enhance 
Taiwan’s state of military readiness and enable its armed forces to use weapons systems 
already in its possession to their full capacity. During this expansion, on-going 
Congressional debate regarding White House Taiwan policy highlighted the lack of 
weapon sales as a direct threat to the ROC’s continued security and sought to overrule 
President Clinton’s soft approach through legislation designed to clarify and enhance 
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American responsibilities under the Taiwan Relations Act.86 Irrespective of these 
objections, a subsequent DoD review of these enhanced exchanges published in 2000 
found that,  
These initiatives provide an avenue to exchange views on Taiwan’s 
requirements for defense modernization, to include professionalization and 
organizational issues, and training. Exchanges and discussions enhance 
our ability to assess Taiwan’s longer term defense needs and develop well-
founded security assistance policies. Such programs also enhance 
Taiwan’s capacity for making operationally sound and cost effective 
acquisition decisions, and more importantly, to use its equipment more 
effectively for self-defense.87
 These seemingly contradictory approaches to improving security and stability in 
the west Pacific region both provided substantial foundation for the George W. Bush 
Administration to develop an even more robust plan for improving military ties with the 
government on Taiwan. Beginning his term of office with unambiguous declarations of 
support for Taiwan and implied endorsement of independence, President George W. 
Bush upended decades of nuanced American diplomatic policy which balanced PRC 
sensitivities with historic U.S. commitment to ROC self-determination.88 While rapid 
State Department damage control reestablished the long-term status quo with reasserted 
promises to adhere to the One China policy, the Bush Administration noticeably 
upgraded its military-to-military relations program with the ROC over the course of its 
first four years. Among the many tell-tale signs of a strengthening bond in defense 
cooperation is the transfer of security assistance duties at the de facto U.S. embassy, the 
American Institute in Taiwan (AIT), from civilian contractors to active-duty military 
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personnel.89 While U.S. officials declare this change to be a simple administrative action 
designed to increase personnel efficiency, political leaders in the PRC see this move as a 
major policy reversal that favors ROC President Chen Shui-bian and his pro-
independence platform. In addition to these programs to increase U.S.-ROC dialogue on 
improving military doctrine, strategy and operations being a substantial boon to Taiwan’s 
military efficiency, Bush proposals for vastly increased weapons sales to the ROC had 
significant potential to counter what was perceived as a growing imbalance of military 
capabilities on either side of the Taiwan Straits. These proposals to sell Kidd-class 
destroyers, P-3 Orion anti-submarine aircraft, diesel submarines and the PAC-3 missile 
defense system have proven difficult to implement due to a broad range of issues ranging 
from ROC domestic politics and fiscal concerns to PRC protests against U.S. meddling. 
Furthermore, there is some concern in U.S. policy circles that the ROC is delaying the 
purchase of these systems in order to “free ride” on American overtures promising to 
defend the island from invasion.90  
Although several of these purchases are proceeding piecemeal, the impact of this 
episode in U.S.-ROC defense cooperation is yet to be determined. Negative feelings 
between American and Taiwanese government officials over accusations and counter-
accusations may translate into reduced cooperation as the Bush Administration proceeds 
into its next term of office; however, this does not seem likely. The dramatic turnovers in 
the American Executive branch’s leadership positions will likely reinforce the importance 
of maintaining good relations with both the PRC and ROC in the coming years. 
Balancing the importance of economic development of the mainland with political 
liberalization on Taiwan will be a dynamic process within the higher levels of 
government, yet maintenance of the status quo is still the most stable policy for American 
interaction in the west Pacific. 
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C. U.S. INFLUENCE ON ROC MILITARY PROFESSIONALISM  
Since the earliest days of official American relations with the Nationalist 
government of China, the United States government has attempted to influence the 
capability, efficiency and professionalism of ROC military forces. Military-to-military 
relations during the Japanese invasion were primarily focused upon bolstering the ROC 
armed forces through massive equipment transfers and economic aid provided with very 
few strings attached. Providing Chiang Kai-shek’s military regime a free hand in the 
distribution of these resources merely perpetuated the corrupt and inefficient management 
of his armed forces and virtually ensured that Mao’s army would defeat them once the 
civil war resumed following the Japanese occupation. As the ROC’s continued survival 
after its transfer to the island of Taiwan was primarily contingent on good relations with 
the United States, Chiang’s military dictatorship opened its territory to a long term 
deployment of American military liaisons, training missions and operational units. From 
1954 until de-recognition in 1979, the United States provided military assistance and 
operational capabilities to the ROC under the auspices of the U.S.-ROC Mutual Defense 
Treaty. In addition to the U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) that was 
established in 1951, large numbers of American military personnel were deployed to 
Taiwan in order to provide a credible defense against PLA forces from the mainland.91 
Build-up of American naval and air forces on and around the island of Formosa 
throughout the 1950s not only insured against PRC attack, but provided the United States 
with sufficient leverage with the Chiang regime to force political and structural changes 
on his governing institutions and various military organizations. 
American-style military professionalism made its way into the developing ROC 
military from the bottom, through in-country training of soldiers and technicians, and 
from the top, through the influence of senior officers educated in the United States. One 
particular case study highlights best this top-down phenomenon. General Sun Li-jen, one 
of Nationalist China’s most successful officers during the Japanese Occupation and a 
1927 graduate of the Virginia Military Institute (VMI), took charge of training ROC 
armies on Formosa in 1946 and became commander-in-chief of the Nationalist Army in 
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1950.92 During his tenure, General Sun brought to bear many of the lessons he learned 
from his formal military education and his many combined operations under General 
Stillwell in the China-Burma-India theater of operations. Known as the “Ever Victorious 
General”, this central figure shaped the ROC’s nascent defense forces in many ways to 
conform to American expectations and the standards of behavior that would ensure a 
successful combined defense of the island throughout the Cold War. General Sun’s 
impact upon the security apparatus of the ROC is uncontestable and the effects of his 
term in office would be felt by his nation’s military even into the 21st century. Officer 
candidates from the ROC attend centers of military education, such as VMI and The 
Citadel still today and add their American experiences to the collective body of 
knowledge that will form Taiwanese defense policies in the decades to come.93
Even accounting for the extended retrenchment of U.S.-ROC military relations 
from 1979 through the end of the Cold War, the substantial material, financial and 
experiential support provided to the Taiwanese defense establishment over the past sixty 
years created a bond that has developed into a feeling of mutual reliance and 
responsibility for stability of the security environment in the Taiwan Straits. Through the 
ebb and flow of American engagement with the ROC over the course of the past six 
decades, Taiwan has remained an important partner in promoting U.S. interests in East 
Asia. The continuation of educational exchanges, defensive equipment sales and 
functional-level dialogue will promote positive communications between American and 
ROC military leaders for the foreseeable future. 
Throughout the Cold War, American military engagement with the Republic of 
China on Taiwan provided U.S. policy-makers significant opportunities to shape the 
political environment of East Asia in order to combat communist global aspirations. 
During the past decade, this relationship paid significant additional dividends in shaping 
the political liberalization of the ROC government and influenced the evolution of 
democratic institutions present on the island today. Maintaining these links in spite of  
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drastic shifts in American policy, such as rapprochement with the PRC and de-
recognition of the ROC, has also demonstrated to the ROC’s regional neighbors that the 
United States remained concerned with the stability and security of Asia as a whole.  
Corollary relationships with other Asian polities did not always meet with the 
same levels of success as the U.S.-ROC engagement program.94 However, another 
positive example of American military aid acting as a positive influence upon the 
domestic political evolution and economic development of its regional partners can be 
found within the special relationship the United States has had with the Kingdom of 
Thailand during the same period. While American Cold War interactions with both of 
these case study governments supported regimes that suppressed public freedoms and 
democratic movements when these concerns were secondary to the threat of global 
communism, these lengthy and sustained relationships laid the foundation for the 
transitions to democracy we have seen in recent years. This phenomenon demonstrates 
the importance of establishing and maintaining persistent links with the military forces of 
the PRC in order that we may encourage similar developments within that nation as well. 
While the differences in size, ideology and contrary positions of national interests make 
the proposition of treating the PLA like its ROC and Thai counterparts seem 
counterfactual, the lessons learned from these relationships can help guide future 
American policy-makers in their efforts to manage U.S.-PRC relations as a whole. 
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IV. U.S. ENGAGEMENT WITH THAILAND 
Civil-Military relations in Kingdom of Thailand during the modern era represent 
an excellent case study for discussing the significant impact military forces bent on 
democratic reformation can have on the development of a national political 
consciousness. The lessons learned from Thailand’s political evolution and America’s 
special relationship with the military forces of that nation has obvious significance for 
other U.S. relations in Asia, including with the PRC and Taiwan. During the course of the 
past three-quarters of a century, Thailand has transformed its governing structures from 
that of an absolute monarchy, through various stages of authoritarian military rule and 
dysfunctional parliamentary democracy. Over these many years, the Royal Thai Army 
(RTA) has developed a national self-image as the protector of democracy and has 
legitimized violent coups on the basis of moral and political authority stemming from 
sources above and outside the standing government. Whether justly responding to 
systemic corruption and nepotism in the governing bureaucracy or simply advocating one 
cabal’s parochial interests over another, this seemingly endless string of usurpations of 
power by the military has plagued the Thai polity’s attempts at true representative 
democracy. While the earliest of these juntas professed egalitarian ideals and democratic 
principles, combinations of legitimate threats to state security and personal desires of 
military strongmen to perpetuate autocratic rule led to the repression of free elections and 
rule of law for over four decades following the fall of the absolute monarchy. 
The Thai military’s long history of professionalism, political activism, and 
modernization based on Western organizational principles laid a solid foundation for its 
most recent transformation into a responsible actor within the parameters of the state and 
the confines of the rule of law. Over the course of the 20th century, various external 
forces have influenced the size, composition and roles of the RTA both as an instrument 
of national security and the primary power behind the policy making apparatus of the 
Thai state. During the latter half of this past century, the United States has been one of 
the most significant outside actors pushing the Thai military further down the path toward 
acceptance of a more apolitical role for itself in domestic governance and a stricter 
interpretation of its roles and responsibilities with respect to the people of Thailand. 
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While modern U.S. support for Thailand began with the anti-Japanese underground 
during World War II95, American aid for the Thai military greatly expanded in 1950 
through a variety of agreements including grants and weapons procurement credits.96 
Even though this extensive relationship encountered difficulty following the cessation of 
U.S. military operations in Vietnam, a significant number of mutually beneficial 
modernization and security building programs continued to strengthen the bond between 
the two nations. A number of education and training programs, exchange officer projects, 
weapon system sales and large-scale exercises continue to show the Thai domestic polity 
and various regional political players that the United States highly values its special 
relationship with the Kingdom of Thailand. 
While American defense relations with Thailand achieved the primary desired 
effects of institutionalizing of military professionalism, promoting the U.S.-held beliefs 
concerning the subjugation of military forces under the control of a civilian government 
met with significant resistance. Throughout America’s Cold War interaction with the 
Kingdom of Thailand, support for anti-communist policies took precedence over the 
promotion of democratic values within the Thai military leadership. During this period, 
many very capable senior-ranking officers used their technical proficiency and 
charismatic strength of will to derail the formation of liberal democratic institutions, 
subdue popular demands for reform and divert national political power from elected 
officials to appointed bureaucrats and uniformed personnel.97 However, the end of the 
Cold War removed the primary threat to state internal security and downgraded the Thai 
military’s status as sole provider of moral leadership and social stability. This loss of 
mandate became apparent in the public response to the military coup of 1991.  
Following the antiquated paradigm of responding to domestic public dissent 
against military-government dictates, on 18 May 1992, RTA forces engaged 
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demonstrators with lethal force, killing 44 student protesters and wounding 38 others.98 
Reflecting post-Cold War globalization trends and recognizing international pressures to 
depart from draconian governing tools, King Bhumibol publicly ordered the military to 
desist in its heavy-handed tactics, deal with the protestors peacefully and negotiate on an 
equal footing. This crisis began the long, and as yet incomplete, process of removing the 
Thai armed forces from its central role in government and curtailing senior officers’ 
involvement in national policy formation to those areas where their technical expertise 
directly applies.99 While this transition from activist policy-maker to subservient tool for 
state security and economic development will continue in the coming decades due to 
internal guidance from the monarch, direction by the civilian bureaucracy and in response 
to popular demands, the Thai military’s ability to respond has been shaped by its 
relationship with the United States. Even though broad-ranging and long-term military-
to-military relations between the United States and the Kingdom of Thailand failed to 
secure civilian dominance over the use of military force, the technical proficiency and 
professionalism imbued into the Thai armed forces through this relationship greatly 
facilitated the kingdom’s ability to liberalize once the decision to reform had been made. 
A. HISTORY OF THAI CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS  
Under the absolute monarchy of the Chakri Dynasty, traditional practices 
developed prior to Siam’s exposure to the Western powers shaped the relationship 
between its governing bureaucracy and its military forces. Palace appointments to high 
military command often flowed along royal bloodlines and passed among those deemed 
most politically reliable by the monarch and his closest advisors. Given these close 
political links, the practice of incorporating military leaders into the decision-making 
process of the central government was a natural outgrowth of the organization and 
structure of the royal military forces. Recognizing the dangers to his kingdom’s national 
sovereignty and territorial integrity posed by encroaching Western colonial powers, King 
Mongut (reigned 1851-68) began a series of governmental reforms, including military 
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reorganization, based on European structural models.100 King Chulalongkorn (1868-
1910), Mongut’s eldest son and successor, continued his father’s reform efforts by 
expanding the scope of his country’s modernization (and Westernization) throughout the 
social, economic and military spheres. Systematic reform of the armed forces throughout 
this period resulted in the formation of a standing army and navy, as well as, a highly 
complex and well-organized bureaucracy with which to manage it. However, in the 
process of inculcating the professional skills and organizational constructs of Western 
militaries, Siamese officer corps learned a great deal about the social and political 
benefits of Europe’s comparatively more liberal systems of government.101 Thus, when 
Chulalongkorn’s son, Vajiravudh (1910-25), proved less capable than his father at 
managing the affairs of the nation, the military’s high level of education, training and 
sense of responsibility to the nation resulted in a military coup attempt on November 11, 
1911.102 The young officers that perpetrated this rebellion envisioned an end to the 
ineffective rule of the absolute monarch and the beginning of an era of republican rule 
similar to those Western models they had been exposed to during their education and 
training. While this first break between the military and the monarchy failed to achieve 
its goal, it provided ample precedent for the successful revolt of 1932. Staged in the midst 
of the economic hardship of the Great Depression, a coalition of mid-level military 
officers and civilian bureaucrats joined together to force the King to abdicate his position 
as absolute monarch in favor of a constitutional government. However, given the unstable 
nature of this fledging democracy, military rule would continue, in cooperation with the 
existing civilian bureaucracy and with support from the United States government, under 
the guise of a parliamentary system for decades to come. 
The first major turning point for Thai civil-military relations occurred in 1973 as a 
confluence of popular demonstrations against the military-appointed government and a 
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power play by a so-called “soft-liner”, RTA Commander-in-Chief General Krit Sivara.103 
Backed by pro-democracy forces among the nation’s political and economic elites, 
including King Bhumibol, the recently appointed Commander-in-Chief withheld his 
support from the sitting Prime Minister, General Thanom, and Deputy Prime Minister, 
General Praphat, at a critical juncture. Disregarding their orders to suppress crowds of 
students demonstrating for free elections and against the authoritarian military regime, 
General Krit humiliated the leaders of the junta, forced them from office and allowed the 
appointment of liberal leadership and rapid reform of the autocratic government 
bureaucracy. This type of factionalism within the military was commonplace throughout 
the modern era of Thailand’s political development and often shaped the character of one 
military coup with respect to another. However, in this instance, unlike the takeovers of 
the past, the leading military figure supported the popular cries for liberal democracy led 
by civilian authorities. Even though the appointed civilian government was able to hold 
national assembly elections in 1975, factionalism within the majority political party, 
disgruntled economic elites and military machinations forestalled the consolidation of 
democracy and reinstituted government guided by military junta in 1976.104  
Economic growth and expanding social opportunity allowed Thailand’s “semi-
democracy” to prosper throughout the 1980s under the guidance of an elected 
parliamentary government that, while outwardly civilian led, was under the firm control 
of the military bureaucracy. However, with the fall of the Soviet Union and the 
concurrent reduction in threat to national security from communist insurgency, many 
liberal thinkers and business elites began to outwardly question the legitimacy of 
Thailand’s authoritarian government. Therefore, in February 1991, General Suchinda 
Kraprayoon usurped power from the sitting government and reversed Thailand’s progress 
toward liberal governance by implementing an authoritarian constitution and 
manipulating the March 1992 elections to ensure his continued control. Pro-democracy 
groups once again took to the streets in protest. On May 20th, 1992, following three days 
of confrontations between student protestors and military forces, King Bhumibol 
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intervened to stop the bloodshed and restore peace and stability to his country.105 In an 
unprecedented televised royal audience, the King held both parties equally culpable for 
the tragic events of Black May, forced General Suchinda to relinquish his position as 
Prime Minister and called for new elections, which were held in September of 1992. This 
overt revocation of palace support for military governance, compounded by globalization 
trends and international pressure against such autocratic methods of rule began what has 
become over a decade of steady democratization and decline in military intervention in 
politics. 
B. U.S. MILITARY ENGAGEMENT WITH THAILAND  
The rocky beginnings for U.S. relations with Thailand in the first years following 
WWII should come as no surprise given the Thai domestic political environment and 
American global priorities during this period of reconstruction. In late 1944, with the 
collapse of Japan’s ability to resist Allied advances in the Pacific imminent, the pro-Axis 
government of Field Marshall Phibun Songkhram could no longer resist the political and 
insurgent pressures of the Free Thai movement, led by his once close friend Pridi 
Phanomyong.106 Due to their wartime history as a recipient of U.S. and British support 
against Japanese forces occupying Thailand, Pridi and other Free Thai leaders were able 
to assuage the Allies’ anger over the Phibun government’s declaration of war once they 
rose to positions of power within the government. However, America’s primary concern 
during 1944-45 was not the stability of a fledgling Thai democracy, but the economic and 
political restoration of Western Europe. Recurring requests from Prime Minister Pridi and 
Thai military leaders loyal to him for American military aid were delayed or disregarded 
by officials in Washington. This lack of overt support for the pro-democracy Pridi regime 
greatly contributed to the unstable political environment that allowed Phibun to return to 
power following a coup staged by army officers loyal to him on 9 November 1947. Even 
though U.S. State Department officials recommended strong measures designed to 
overturn the pro-Phibun junta in order to promote a more moderate government, a series 
of concurrent advances by communist insurgents and political groups in Malaya, Burma, 
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India and Vietnam required that the United States support a strong, anti-communist 
authoritarian over weaker, pro-democracy alternatives. To many U.S. policy-makers, 
Phibun and his ability to command the loyalty of the RTA seemed to be the only means 
to ensure that Thailand maintained its pro-America stance during a period of heightened 
communist popularity. 
Thus, as Phibun’s political allies worked to redefine American views of his pro-
Japan policies and improve Western perspectives with regard to his potential as a strong, 
but moderating force within the Thai polity, elements of the U.S. foreign policy 
bureaucracy began to reconsider their stance against providing military aid to the once 
and future dictator of Thailand. However, as of early 1949, the corrupt and ineffective 
utilization of American military aid by Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalist Chinese in the 
defense of mainland China against Mao Tse-tung’s Communist forces convinced 
Secretary of State Dean Acheson that the unstable government in Bangkok would 
similarly squander these extremely limited resources.107 These State Department upper-
echelon concerns were reversed later that same year under pressures from the United 
States Congress and public criticism demanding that something be done to stem the tide 
of communism that had overcome China and threatened the entire East and Southeast 
Asian landmass.  With Acheson firmly behind a policy of providing military aid to anti-
communist governments in Southeast Asia, Prime Minister Phibun began to increase his 
anti-communist rhetoric specifically to gain American favor and ensure access to the 
advanced weapons, training and logistic support he desperately needed to curry the favor 
of his RTA supporters. Economic and technical aid began to flow from the United States 
to Thailand during the summer of 1950 in a what amounted to a blatant quid pro quo for 
Thailand’s diplomatic recognition of the American-supported Bao Dai government of 
Vietnam and Phibun’s dispatch of Thai military forces in support of the United Nations 
mission to defend South Korea from the communist invasion. This firm and overt 
selection of the anti-communist camp, as well as various public denunciations of Mao’s 
newly established government, thrust the Thai government from its normally flexible 
foreign policy position to one of rigid semi-alliance with America and its Western 
capitalist clique. Wholeheartedly following the U.S. lead on a wide range of economic 
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and security policies did not engender strong support for Prime Minister Phibun among 
the liberal and staunchly nationalist interest groups within Thailand, but his ability to 
control the RTA and arm it with American-made weapons allowed the authoritarian 
government to suppress those dissenting voices. 
While Phibun’s dependence on American military aid drove his government to 
endorse and implement policies that were often unpopular among the Thai domestic 
constituency, U.S. dependence on Thailand as the core of its foreign policy in Southeast 
Asia required acceptance of the military dictatorship’s undemocratic principles. This 
interdependence and America’s growing anti-communist activism in Southeast Asia both 
allowed and encouraged Thailand’s military rulers to suppress liberal dissent within their 
borders regardless of its ties to organized communist efforts to undermine the 
government. Furthermore, the parallel goals of American and Phibun anti-communist 
policies made collaboration in covert counter-insurgency training and clandestine support 
for Thailand-based Chinese Nationalist Party rebels effective programs for further 
intertwining the two nations in a semi-alliance of broad ranging implications. A symbolic 
turning point in this relationship followed in September 1954 with the signing of the 
Manila Pact and the formation of the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO) 
which, while indicating mutual support of the member nations, fell far short of the 
inclusive collective security assurances of its North Atlantic counterpart. Throughout the 
early 1950s, the various programs of military assistance and security cooperation between 
Thailand and the United States served the practical needs of the patron for a stable anti-
communist base in Southeast Asia and solidified the power of a military government that 
grew more authoritarian and corrupt with each passing year. Because of the growing 
unpopularity of America’s exploitation of Thailand to implement its foreign policy 
against the various communist movements throughout Southeast Asia, U.S. policy 
makers had no choice other than to continue support for the repressive government of 
Phibun and his junta. 
Over the course of the next twenty years, various domestic political struggles 
between military factions created a continuous cycle of liberalization and retrenchment 
by the ruling government in order to manipulate popular sentiment and gain support for 
specific policy initiatives. During this period, however, the United States government 
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found itself opposed to Thai efforts to expand democratic rule due to the strength of anti-
American sentiments, incessant factionalism among social groups and weak resistance to 
communist efforts to undermine the pro-Western government. Realpolitik concerns for 
expanding U.S. influence throughout Southeast Asia made military cooperation with 
Thailand a poor tool for encouraging democracy or bringing liberal governance to that 
nation’s rank-and-file citizenry. However, along with the effect of increasing the Thai 
government’s internal security apparatus through arms and training, American aid 
provided significant infrastructure and economic opportunities to underdeveloped regions 
of the country.108  
Running in concert with a shift in the RTA’s counter-insurgency strategy, from 
pure oppression to military-led rural development, U.S. military construction provided a 
vehicle for improving the economic well-being of the disenfranchised masses. In addition 
to roads and facilities built for strategic purposes, the RTA engaged in construction and 
education programs designed to improve the social welfare and political reliability of 
thousands of communities in rural areas most vulnerable to communist insurgency and 
propaganda. This extensive national development program laid the foundation for 
increased participation of the populace in the nation’s political processes and, after the 
1973 civilian uprising forced the Thanom military regime from power, the central 
government began to actively promote citizens’ right to join political parties and activist 
organizations. While the military once again asserted its dominance over the Thai 
political system in 1976, the junta that came to power in 1977 was of a significantly more 
liberal ilk than its predecessors.109 Whereas in the past the central government saw an 
opening up of the democratic process as weakening the state against the communist 
threat, this new era of leadership focused on the nation-building effects of empowering its 
citizenry with a voice in the governance of the country. Finally recognizing that broad-
ranging repression of dissent was counter-productive to the overall counter-insurgency 
effort, the military-led government focused even greater resources on national economic 
development and political liberalization during the late 1970s and early 1980s.   
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Throughout this period leading up to the Thai government’s declaration of victory 
over the Communist Party of Thailand (CPT) in 1983, American financial aid and 
military support provided the economic resources and regime stability necessary for the 
continuation of this democratization process. While the elimination of the CPT threat 
strengthened the nation overall, this victory removed one of the primary factors 
legitimizing the military’s leadership role in the government. The collapse of the Soviet 
Union and the end of the Cold War further reduced the ability of the military to justify its 
central role in the parliamentary government and allowed the civilian bureaucracy to 
peacefully take over many primary positions of authority. By the late 1980s the 
democratic process in Thailand had become institutionalized, yet some within the 
military maintained an agenda of dictatorial rule regardless of the social and political 
forces at work, both at home and throughout the post-Cold War international community. 
Lacking the political backing of the United States, the 1991 military coup led by General 
Suchinda was unable to consolidate its control and was forced from office by popular 
dissent reinforced by royal decree in May of the following year.  
Like its support for many developing nations during the Cold War, the United 
States military program of aid to the Thai government from the early 1950s through the 
1970s was focused primarily on the stability of its anti-communist regime. Fully 
understanding the repressive nature of the Thai military dictatorships of this period, the 
U.S. government chose to support the repression of democratic institutions in the face of 
an overwhelming threat from the expansion of Soviet influence throughout Asia. As the 
threat of global communist revolution subsided, the lengthy and extensive military-to-
military relationship between the United States and the Kingdom of Thailand proved to 
be a foundation for economic development, the creation of a Thai middle class and the 
stable growth of democratic institutions during the 1990s through the present.  
However, while consolidation of Thai democracy continues under the recently 
reelected coalition government headed by Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, policy 
pundits in the United States fear that unfettered support for the incumbent regime will 
encourage the growth of authoritarianism in Thailand for the near future. As was the case 
during the Cold War, the U.S. government has a myriad of concerns in Asia that may 
relegate the expansion of democracy to a secondary priority. As Washington hopes to 
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maintain a strong ally in its prosecution of terrorist groups in Southeast Asia and a 
bulwark against the potential for PRC expansion in the region, American policy-makers 
may find that pragmatism prevails once again. When the threat was insurgents backed by 
the world communist revolution, Washington turned a blind eye to the repression of civil 
liberties in the name of maintaining stability and a pro-Western regime in power. Now, 
the threat of Jihadist insurgents undermining regional security may drive a similar 
attitude in the White House and among members of Congress. The recent elevation of 
Thailand to a status of ‘Major Non-NATO Ally’ provides the Thai government access to 
a significant range of fiscal and military materiel resources with which they may develop 
more robust counter-terror capabilities.110 Yet, as in the 1960s and 1970s, this same 
material and financial support can easily be converted into a capability to maintain 
political control of the Thai polity through force. Continuing American efforts to improve 
the Thai armed forces’ combat effectiveness, organizational efficiency and military 
professionalism has significant implications for Thai domestic politics and U.S. foreign 
policy throughout East and Southeast Asia in the coming decade. 
C. U.S. INFLUENCE ON THAI MILITARY PROFESSIONALISM  
In addition to extensive political and financial support, the U.S. government 
provided significant numbers of military advisors, influenced Thai educational programs 
and allowed the Thai military access to advanced training that would shape the 
perspectives of a broad range of policy-makers in the Royal Thai Government throughout 
the past half century. Programs designed to expose Thai civilian bureaucrats to U.S. 
methods of governance and administration were begun by the U.S. Agency for 
International Development (AID) as early as 1951.111 The long term impact of this 
education aid program on the formation and administration of the Thai government is 
readily apparent from the number of senior leaders that hold degrees from American 
institutions and the number of Thai military officers with U.S. military education. A 
review of the military officers alone reveals that over 200 individuals received 
undergraduate education from U.S. service academies or private military schools. As of 
 
110 “Fact Sheet: Major Non-NATO Ally (MNNA) Status for Thailand,” U.S. Embassy in Thailand (12 
February 2004). [On-line] available from: http://bangkok.usembassy.gov/apec2003/factsheetmnna.htm; 
Internet; accessed 12 Mar 2005. 
111 Muscat, 50. 
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early 2004, there were forty Thai General Officers and forty-five Colonels possessing 
academic degrees from American military universities.112 Throughout their careers, these 
senior officers have applied the lessons learned from their various interactions with 
American counterparts to their decision making processes. While not all decisions made 
by these senior officials were directly consonant with U.S. interests, the foundational 
experiences provided by an American military education improves the ability of Thai 
officers to understand and predict Washington’s response to a given policy shift or 
directive. The attendant reduction in miscommunication and common backgrounds 
between senior leaders in both nations’ armed forces that these shared experiences 
provide often facilitates meaningful discussion on points that would otherwise be 
extremely contentious. 
In addition to educational opportunities, large scale combined arms exercises 
build common operating procedures, improve combat efficiency and promote bonds of 
camaraderie between American and Thai military personnel. Aside from the inherent 
benefits to Thai doctrine and tactics development, the recurring shared experiences 
between large numbers of U.S. and Thai troops build a sense of common purpose and 
mutual identification of their opposite number as a cooperative partner. Exercise COBRA 
GOLD represents the most salient example of cooperative exercises between American 
and Asian armed forces. Conducted continuously since 1982, COBRA GOLD provides 
an opportunity for each of the branches of service in both nations’ militaries to learn 
tactics, technique and procedures from one another, while also affording American troops 
the chance for exposure to Thailand’s rich culture and environment.113 Furthermore, this 
large  scale  exercise  may  form  the  core  of  future  multinational  security  cooperation  
 
112 The Thai Joint Staff Office provided a listing of Thai officers with American military education by 
institution, graduation year and included present rank of each individual spanning from 1957 until 2003.  
An overwhelming majority of these officers graduated from the private institutions (VMI-62, Norwich 
Academy-55, and The Citadel-55) while the Service Academies (USNA-8, USMA-12, USAFA-13) 
produced only a small fraction of the whole. Col Thawip Netniyom to Capt Michael Bolen, “Information 
on Thai West Point Grads,” [email] January 18, 2005. 
113 “History of Exercise COBRA GOLD,” Asia-Pacific Area Network (26 May 2004); [On-line] 
available from: http://www.apan-info.net/cobragold/history.asp; Internet; accessed 3 Mar 2005. 
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initiatives. Already, COBRA GOLD 2004 included participants from Singapore and 
Mongolia as well as observers from Australia, India, Pakistan, Japan, Indonesia, South 
Korea, Sri Lanka, Vietnam and China.114
Military-to-military relationships between the United States and the Kingdom of 
Thailand during the 1950s and 1960s proved to be a foundation for long-term economic 
development, the creation of a Thai middle class and the stable growth of democratic 
institutions during the 1990s through the present. Continuing educational exchanges and 
large-scale exercises promote common understanding and experiential bonds between the 
armed forces of both nations as they progress into the 21st century. An American program 
of long-term engagement with the Thai military, continued through periods of political 
upheaval and digressing foreign policy goals, has begun to pay huge dividends for both 
governments and their constituencies. Among these is the realization of an American goal 
to see democratic institutions flourish in Southeast Asia.  
1. Thai Civil-Military Relations during the Democratic Era  
Following the 1992 restoration of civilian leadership within the Thai central 
government, that nation’s military forces have shown restraint and deference to civil 
authority with regard to a wide range of legislative actions that significantly reduced the 
scope of the RTA’s responsibilities. Among these were revisions to the Government 
Administration in a Crisis Act of 1952 and the Martial Law Act of 1954, as well as the 
elimination of the Internal Security Act of 1976.115 Not only did the military leadership 
allow this whittling away of its domestic authority, but it remain reticent as the civilian 
bureaucracy dismantled the Capital Peacekeeping Command, its primary institution for 
implementing internal security measures during times of crisis in Bangkok. Furthermore, 
this political retrenchment exhibited itself in official doctrine and has been espoused 
publicly by military leaders at the highest levels. Recognizing the end of the autocratic 
era after the Bloody May incident in 1992, Air Chief Marshal Voranat Apicharee, 
supreme commander of Thai military forces stated simply, “Professional soldiers do not 
 
114 “Multinational Observers Study COBRA GOLD’s Combined Ethos,” Asia-Pacific Area Network 
(23 May 2004); [On-line] available from: http://www.apan-info.net/cobragold/fullstory.asp?id=46; Internet; 
accessed 3 Mar 2005.  
115 Surachart, 80. 
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stage coups.”116 This archetypical example of the transformation of the military’s self-
defined role in politics remained a truism for the decade that followed and promises to 
hold true for many years to come. 
While the military’s role in government has been significantly altered by domestic 
events and external influences, its national development and defense missions have 
endured and even expanded in the post-Cold War era. The technical proficiency and 
growing apolitical professionalism of the RTA and its maritime and air service 
counterparts have allowed the Thai military institution to remains a pillar of strength 
upon which the national bureaucracy can rely. While military officers have lost the 
legitimate right to directly govern the nation, the defense establishment as a whole has 
become synonymous with public welfare and national security. A continuation of the 
highly successful rural development programs of the 1970s and 80s has provided ample 
opportunity for the Thai military to demonstrate its ability to act responsibly for the good 
of the public and further remove itself from the stigma of its past transgressions. While 
the general populace maintains their past view of the military as a righteous defender of 
the state, it no longer recognizes that institution as having either a higher authority to 
govern or a greater ability to bring peace and internal security to the nation than a 
democratically elected civilian government. 
Over the course of the past half century, the extensive military-to-military 
relationship between the United States and the Kingdom of Thailand has been the 
foundation for a broad sweeping alliance that brought economic prosperity and national 
development to the Thai people. While various periods of internal security crisis and 
political upheaval created an environment unfavorable for the promotion of democracy 
within the Thai polity, the constant interplay between the defense establishments of these 
two nations laid the ground work for communication and cooperation well outside the 
strict bounds of physical security policy or force modernization. By encouraging the 
adaptation of Western organizational structures within the military and civilian 
government bureaucracies, American defense officials created points of commonality that 
paid great dividends toward bringing Thailand into synchronization with U.S. foreign 
policy objectives. Furthermore, continuing combined large-scale defense exercises will 
 
116 Surachart, 77. 
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maintain interoperability between U.S. and Thai command and control systems, reinforce 
common procedures for joint combat operations and encourage high standards of 
excellence for officer corps performance. These and many other intangible benefits of 
military-to-military relations with the Thai defense establishment more than justify the 
effort and expense of continuing U.S. engagement policies with this most important 
Southeast Asian ally. In the years to come, Thailand will grow into its role as a regional 
model for economic prosperity and democratic political evolution. By supporting the 
various Thai regimes of the past half century and encouraging that nation’s transition 
toward liberal governing structures and an apolitical military force, the United States 
government has enabled the Kingdom of Thailand to become a stable and responsible 
member of the global community. 
Over the course of the past sixty years, the governments of the Kingdom of 
Thailand and the United States have cooperated across a broad spectrum of 
developmental programs, foreign policy initiatives and efforts to maintain stability and 
security throughout Southeast Asia. The rapport between both nations’ armed services 
has also endured in spite of vacillating American policy platforms, political upheaval 
within the Thai government and negative popular opinion concerning the U.S. presence 
in Southeast Asia. By maintaining this special relationship through good times and bad, 
each side has created an environment conducive to enhancing the mutual interests long 
into the future. This model can well address the problem of improving U.S.-PRC 
relations by recognizing that each side’s parochial interests can best be served through 
cooperation across the full gamut of security, economic and political arenas. Just as anti-
communist counter-insurgency cooperation between the United States and the Kingdom 
of Thailand brought together their two governments during the Cold War, so too could 
the common threat of global terrorism serve to intertwine the interests of Washington and 
Beijing. Recognizing the many interests shared by the U.S. and PRC polities is an 
important step in the confidence and trust-building processes that are necessary for 
maintaining security and stability in the Asia-Pacific theater in the coming decades. 
However, combined U.S.-PRC efforts to thwart terrorist operations only address a single 
area of common interest. Just as contemporary U.S.-Thai military exchanges and training 
initiatives demonstrate that cooperation during crises can lead to peacetime collaboration, 
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so too should increased U.S.-PRC combined counter-terror operations, counter-drug 

















The People’s Republic of China is a rising power in Asia with significant and 
growing influence in the global market economy. Fueled by extremely high rates of GDP 
expansion, the PRC military has achieved a high state of professionalism compared to the 
abysmal state of readiness exhibited by the PLA prior to Deng Xiaoping’s reform efforts 
of the late 1970s. By continuing to treat the PRC as a Cold War adversary, implementing 
policies to contain its peaceful rise and attempting to isolate the nation from opportunities 
to improve the social welfare of its citizenry, the United States will create the political-
military crisis it seeks to avoid. Through a deepened, systemic military-to-military 
relations program, the U.S. government can dispel the distrust and suspicion of the past 
century that existed between itself and the hard-line CCP government of the 1950s and 
1960s and build an interdependent link that will reduce tensions and improve both 
nations’ ability to achieve safety and security for their respective constituencies. Without 
these active measures, the PRC will continue to expand its influence over neighboring 
nations and build a power bloc in opposition to U.S. objectives in East Asia. By creating 
complementary political objectives and enhancing collective security through military 
diplomacy, both the United States and China will attain higher levels of peace and 
prosperity than either nation, acting independently, could achieve. 
The following policy prescriptions incorporate many of the lessons learned from 
American security cooperation with the Kingdom of Thailand and the Republic of China 
on Taiwan. By focusing on long-term, sustained military exchanges, training programs, 
combined operations and exercises, these recommendations attempt to highlight some of 
the more productive cooperative efforts that eventually strengthened government-to-
government relationships outside of areas relating strictly to the defense sector. 
America’s strong relationship with these two polities is no accident of history. The 
binding relationships between the United States and these two governments both grew 
out of intensive management of cooperative security programs, economic and 
infrastructure development aid and many years of dialogue to build trust. These 
relationships demonstrate what could be achieved through a diverse and pervasive 
military-to-military relations program with the People’s Republic of China.  
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A. POSSIBLE POLICY OPTIONS 
1. Continue Congagement Policy 
Bilateral relations between the United States and the PRC have long been a 
domestic political hot-potato for U.S. legislators and the executive branch of government. 
Cold War “containment” policies satisfied generations of Americans for whom China 
represented the final great enemy to conquer in order to rid the world of the scourge of 
communism, while liberal forces within the United States favored a more conciliatory 
stance. While many political pundits considered President Clinton’s “comprehensive 
engagement” program too mollifying in its posture, overlooking blatant risks to national 
security posed by Chinese espionage against U.S. nuclear capabilities and unchecked 
technology transfers from greedy industrial interests, the middle road policy of 
“congagement” leaves much to be desired as well.117 In the early days of President 
George W. Bush’s term of office, this policy included condemning China for its human 
rights violations, establishing the PRC as a “strategic competitor” through political 
rhetoric and belligerently confronting the CCP during the EP-3 crisis of 2001 implied an 
aggressive stance that leaned toward containment while sending mixed signals to both the 
American public and Chinese leadership.118 Later, in order to ensure PRC support in the 
Global War on Terror, the Bush Administration softened its stance toward the PRC, 
supporting China’s economic growth and regional stability. A continuation of these 
policies will enable slow, stable cooperation on issues of grave importance to both sides 
while maintaining a hedge against China’s significant capability to project military force 
in the pursuit of hidden agendas and the CCP’s latent hegemonic disposition. 
2. Initiate Unlimited Cooperation 
Many American foreign policy analysts saw both great potential and extreme 
hazard in the type of extensive cooperation with China pursued by President Clinton 
during his terms of office. Allowing widespread access to a broad range of political, 
 
117 RAND Corp., “Rand Analysts Urge Major Shift in U.S. China Policy,” RAND News Release, 10 
Sep 1999. Available from http://www.rand.org/news/Press.99/china.9.10.html. Internet; accessed 01 Dec 
2004. 
118 George W. Bush, “China and Russia -- Powers in Transition,” Speech presented Simi Valley, 
California, 19 Nov 1999. Available from http://usinfo.state.gov/journals/itps/0900/ijpe/pj52bush.htm. 
Internet; accessed 26 Nov 2004. 
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industrial and technological resources unnerved many Americans and instilled citizens 
with an uneasy sense that U.S. interests were being sold out to kowtow to a rising 
economic power in Asia.119 However, facilitating China’s economic growth brought 
unprecedented anti-corruption efforts, fiscal transparency and social liberalization 
policies to the PRC domestic political landscape. These trends toward increased rule of 
law, growing tolerance for diverging political opinions and economic stability will 
provide the foundation for peaceful coexistence between the United States and PRC. 
Mutually beneficial expansion of commerce and cultural exchange will foster further 
convergence of national interests and minimize points of contention. However, full 
spectrum military relations, including sales of advanced weapon systems, comprehensive 
disclosure of U.S. doctrine and tactics, as well as frequent training missions to improve 
PLA effectiveness in combat would, no doubt build strong relationships between the 
military forces of China and the United States, but the risk involved in this level of 
engagement outweighs the benefits. 
3. Broaden and Systematize Engagement Programs 
Balancing a need for increased cooperation between the DoD and the PLA with a 
pragmatic realization that American and Chinese national interests do not, at present, 
completely coincide necessitates a moderate approach to improving U.S.-PRC military-
to-military relations in the coming decade. By initiating educational exchange programs 
between the two nations’ militaries, engaging in joint exercises of benign missions such 
as search and rescue and increasing the frequency of port visits and confidence building 
events, the U.S. government can walk the fine line between containment and engagement 
while promoting peaceful coexistence. By overcoming the Cold War predisposition to 
view China as the next obvious threat to peace and prosperity on Earth, the United States 
can avoid that self-fulfilling prophecy and help engender an amiable competition for 
scarce resources instead of violent conflict. Laying a foundation at the lowest levels of 
the officer corps, both in the U.S. military and the PLA, for mutual understanding and the 
elimination of preconceived xenophobic notions can yield a future cadre of leaders in the 
 
119 Jeff Gerth, et al., “Evidence of China Plan to Buy Entrée into U.S. Technology,” New York Times, 
15 Dec 1998. Available from http://www.nytimes.com/library/politics/121598donate.html. Internet; 
accessed 28 Nov 2004.  
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defense establishment that can better comprehend the goals and objectives of their 
counterparts across the Pacific. Improvements in formal and informal communication 
pathways between the military institutions of the United States and China will also 
benefit both sides by reducing the likelihood of catastrophic misunderstanding during 
times of crises. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Efforts to improve military-to-military relations between the United States armed 
forces and the PLA must include multi-tiered, broad-scope, stable, long-term programs 
demonstrating a commitment to cooperation and consultation in areas of mutual concern 
to the individual and collective security of both nations. The multi-tiered character of this 
campaign will work to develop lasting relationships between personnel from the various 
counterpart branches of service (Air Force, Navy, Army) of junior, mid-grade and senior 
levels of their respective officer corps. Furthermore, the broad-scope nature of the 
following recommendations is reflected in the diversity of initiatives undertaken to 
expand and deepen our mutual understanding of counterpart motivations, intentions and 
decision-making processes. A wide spectrum of exercises, high-level visits, personnel 
exchanges, education programs, and combined operations will expose common goals and 
interests shared by each nation and reveal opportunities for future cooperation instead of 
avenues for conflict. Finally, past efforts to promote constructive interaction between the 
military forces of the PRC and United States have had neither consistency nor a record of 
cooperation upon which these two nations could build future successes in economic and 
political relations. Until each of the above criteria is met, the pan-Pacific security 
environment will remain unsettled and the defense establishments of both sides will 
continue to hinder positive relations while viewing their opposite number with wariness 
and distrust. Each of the below recommended programs incorporate these elements of 
depth, breadth and duration. While these individual programs all provide opportunities 
for small scale improvements in military-to-military relations, the synergistic effect of 
their simultaneous adoption and parallel application will achieve higher levels of mutual 




1. Military Education Exchanges 
Presently, the United States engages in multi-tiered educational exchanges with 
many of its historic allies, as well as several nations in the process of improving political, 
economic and military relations with the U.S. government. Ample precedents exist for 
direct application to the case of improving full-spectrum education cooperation with the 
PLA, including those programs shared with the Republic of China, the Kingdom of 
Thailand, as well as other Asian partners such as the Republics of India and South Korea. 
While many other successful international military education exchange programs exist, 
these few provide examples of various types of engagement strategies that proponents of 
improved military-to-military relation will necessarily follow. Among these are entry-
level officer candidate experiential tours at counterpart military service academies, mid-
grade postgraduate education at equivalent defense institutions and senior officer 
fellowships at appropriate defense and public policy think tanks. While each U.S. 
military service headquarters staff, and their opposite number in the PLA, PLA Navy and 
PLA Air Force, will delegate implementation of specific programs to appropriate internal 
departments, select exemplary personnel and evaluate project efforts for their desired 
outcomes, centralized administration and oversight must fall to the U.S. Office of the 
Secretary of Defense and the PRC Ministry of Defense. This high-level supervision and 
direction will allow executive authorities of both nations to provide strategic guidance in 
concert with current foreign policy objectives.  
2. Partnership Operations Initiatives 
Given existing tensions between the governments of the United States and the 
PRC, any effort to improve mutual understanding through cooperative engagement, must 
necessarily begin in a somewhat limited fashion. Ever present in the minds of American 
and Chinese policy-makers and citizens alike is the potential for conflict over divergent 
economic, political or social issues, including, but not limited to, the Taiwan Straits 
crisis, expansion of military capabilities, or definitions of domestic human rights. Popular 
sentiments in both nations require that military cooperation begin with training, exercises 
and operations which do not appear to improve the other’s ability to project military 
power or provide greater advantage to one party at the expense of the other. While many 
within the Pentagon have attempted to conduct extensive military-to-military confidence 
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building liaisons, exercises and operations in the recent past, the Department of Defense 
has been hindered in its efforts to build a strong strategic partnership with the PLA by 
pressure from the U.S. Congress. Similarly, the PRC government’s policy of interrupting 
security collaboration in light of short-term crises, such as in the wake of the collision of 
a U.S. EP-3 surveillance plane and a PLAAF fighter aircraft in 2001, limits the 
effectiveness of confidence building programs. Continuing legislative efforts in the 
United States and short-sighted foreign policy decisions within the Chinese government 
will ensure that future collaboration between the PLA and DoD have marginal impact on 
pan-Pacific relations. 
Should these obstacles be removed, both the DoD and the PLA currently engage 
in a wide variety of appropriate combined operations and exercises with the military 
forces of other East and Southeast Asian nations that could readily be expanded into a 
systematic effort to improve relations between their respective nations. Included among 
these are combined air-sea rescue exercises, joint humanitarian assistance efforts, 
cooperative counter-narcotics operations and multinational repatriation of military 
remains endeavors. Combined air-sea rescue exercises have long been used as a means 
for military services to practice non-belligerent skill sets against a common problem of 
interest to all parties. These types of exercises allow for exchanges of ideas between 
military leaders, build communication pathways for use during future crises, demonstrate 
shared professionalism and reveal common bonds of service universal to each side. In 
fact, the United States and China have engaged in this type of joint effort in the past with 
modest levels of success.120 By incorporating air-sea rescue exercises into a solid 
schedule of recurring events of a similar nature, both sides will begin to develop a sense 
of partnership that may carry on into other areas of military cooperation. 
Joint humanitarian assistance efforts, such as the distribution of food aid to 
displaced populace in conflict zones, maintain the principle of low-intensity collaboration 
against international problems of mutual concern. By responding as a combined force to 
refugee crises or United Nations-sponsored peacekeeping operations, the United States 
and China send a strong message that peace, stability and the welfare of those that cannot 
defend themselves is more important than parochial national interests. Furthermore, joint  
120 “PLA, US Military Join Hands in Rescue Exercise,” Xinhua News Agency, 06 Dec 2000. Available 
from http://www.china.org.cn/english/2000/Dec/4996.htm. Internet; accessed 27 Nov 04. 
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humanitarian relief operations serve both sides’ national interests by promoting socio-
political stability and economic environments capable of sustained development. 
Examples of these types of operations include U.S. relief aid during Operation Enduring 
Freedom in Afghanistan and the recent PRC deployment of its People’s Armed Police 
forces to the United Nations peacekeeping mission in Haiti.121  
While inter-agency cooperation between U.S. and PRC law enforcement 
organizations has had significant success in investigating organized crime syndicates 
trafficking in illegal narcotics, this unprecedented collaboration, as reflected in the 
successful conclusion of Operation City Lights in 2003122, should become the norm and 
not the exception. Furthermore, by including the employment of military resources 
against this trans-national problem of mutual concern, both the United States and the 
PRC can more effectively interdict international smuggling operations and build trust 
between the services and agencies involved. Patterning these efforts after the Joint Inter-
Agency Task Force-South (JIATF-S) in Key West, Florida, various U.S. civil and 
military agencies concerned with the reduction of the illegal narcotics trade could come 
together with their Asian counterparts in combined operations centers. These combined 
task forces can pool resources, leverage local expertise and apply unique skill sets, while 
exposing one another to innovative operating procedures and providing insight into each 
other’s decision-making processes. Building trust and confidence through combined 
prosecution of long-standing trans-national problem sets offers the greatest opportunity 
for building stable, long-term relations between the defense establishments of both the 
American government and the leadership of the People’s Republic of China. 
A final example of potential partnership operations can be found in combining the 
existing efforts of both the PRC and U.S. governments to repatriate the remains of their 
war dead that were never accounted for during the various belligerent expeditions 
undertaken by both nations during the past six decades. By acknowledging joint 
responsibility for gaining closure with regard to unresolved Prisoner of War and Missing 
 
121 Edward Cody, “China Readies Riot Force for Peacekeeing in Haiti,” Washington Post, 29 
September 2004. Available from http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/haiti/2004/0929chinafirst.htm  
Internet; accessed 12 Mar 2005. 
122 U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency, “Massive Heroin-Smuggling Organization Dismantled: Historic 
Cooperation Between U.S. and China,” DEA News Release, 16 May 2003. Available from 
http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/pubs/states/newsrel/nyc051603.html. Internet; accessed 28 Nov 2004.  
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in Action (POW/MIA) cases from World War II, the Korean War, the Vietnam War and 
the Cold War, senior government officials, military members and common citizens from 
both countries gain respect for one another. These tangible efforts will progress the mass 
psycho-social healing process of former adversary polities and allow both sides to put old 
differences behind them and focus on future opportunities for peaceful interaction. 
3. Systematic Senior Summits 
A necessary part of any effort to improve understanding of the methods and 
motivations of decision-makers in opposing camps is the face-to-face exchange of senior 
officials through a program of systematic and recurring discussions of topics of mutual 
interest. However, when the governments of the PRC and the United States limit this type 
of exchange to only the very highest levels of military or civilian government leadership, 
innocuous visits take on extremely political ramifications and no substantive discussions 
can take place due to extreme sensitivities to national agendas. By increasing the 
frequency and stabilizing the schedule of these visits, as well as reducing the rank of 
attendees, the sense of regularity and reduced threat level of the exchanges can establish 
working relationships at the regional component deputy commander (two-star flag 
officer) and deputy assistant secretary echelons. These relationships can yield significant 
returns in the reduction of mistrust between senior leaders and the formation of mutually 
beneficial regional security policies. 
Each of the preceding recommendations were designed to serve the national 
interests of both the United States and the PRC, either through direct benefits of 
improving non-combat operating procedures and opening official channels of 
communication or indirectly through confidence building and improving mutual trust. It 
is this latter area that deserves the greatest attention as it has been the most neglected 
during the preceding decades of sporadic contact between the military services of these 
two great nations. Without stable, long-term military-to-military relations, the present 
state of tense tolerance and dubious distrust will continue for the foreseeable future. 
Unfortunately, this is the most likely outcome if the two nations each remain determined 
to proceed only along lines of strict reciprocity. By demanding quid pro quo with regard 
to individual  port  calls and site visits, reciprocal release of internal protocols and access  
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to confidential communications, neither nation will develop the trust nor confidence in its 
opposite number that is necessary to avoid misunderstandings and missteps that could 
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